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ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN ITALY
Livia Giuliani1, Federico Alessandro Goria2 & Elisabetta Silvestri3
1. GENERAL INFORMATION
Italy is a parliamentary republic; although over the years its Con-
stitution has been the subject of some reforms, which have changed 
its original centralized system, introducing a form of regional decen-
tralization, the jurisdiction is still exclusively attributed to the com-
petence of the State (Article 117 of the Italian Constitution).
According to the Italian National Institute of Statistics (Istituto 
italiano di statistica data http://dati.istat.it) at 1st January 2019 the 
resident population was 60,359,546 inhabitants, of which 5,255,503 
foreigners; among the latter the most substantial ethnic groups are rep-
resented by Romanians (1,207,000), Albanians (441,000), Moroccans 
(423,000), Chinese (300,000) and Ukrainians (239,000), who alone 
constitute 50% of the foreign resident population in Italy (National 
demographic balance 2018, p. 6; https://www.istat.it/it/files//2019/07/
Statistica-report-Bilancio-demografico-2018.pdf). The predominant 
religion is the Christian one, in its three components, Roman Catholic 
(by far the majority), Protestant and Orthodox, but there are numerous 
minorities, especially Muslims and Jews (Center for Studies on New 
Religions – Centro studi sulle nuove religioni https://cesnur.com/
il-pluralismo-religioso-italiano-nel-contesto-postmoderno-2/).
The GDP of 2018 is around two thousand billion dollars, while 
the ten-years trend is illustrated by the graph below, also calculated in 
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billions of US dollars (data https://it.tradingeconomics.com/italy/gdp).
The GDP of 2018 is around two thousand billion dollars, while 
the ten-years trend is illustrated by the graph below, also calculated in 
billions of US dollars (data https://it.tradingeconomics.com/italy/gdp).
Chart 01. Italy GDP for the last ten years (2009-2018)
The 2018 Gross National Income at purchasing power parity per 
capita (PPP) is 42,49 $ (World Bank data https://data.worldbank.org/
indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.PP.CD?year_high_desc=true).
The 2017 Inequality Index value is 0.771 (data http://hdr.undp.
org/sites/default/files/2018_human_development_statistical_update.
pdf), while the 2016 poverty rate was 0.137 (data https://data.oecd.
org/inequality/poverty-rate.htm).
The life expectancy at birth are 83,2 years, the expected years 
of schooling are 16,3, while the mean years of schooling are 10,2 
(http://hdr.undp.org/en/2018-update).
The 2018 Human Developement Index (HDI) is 0,880 (http://hdr.
undp.org/en/2018-update).
2. LEGAL SYSTEM
The Italian Republic was established as a result of a popular ref-
erendum that on June 2, 1946 sanctioned the end of monarchy. On the 
same date, the members of the Constituent Assembly were elected; 
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the Constitution of the Italian Republic went into force on January 1, 
1948.4 The Constitution reflects the principle of separation of powers, 
even though the separation cannot be seen as a harsh divide, since 
there is a constant interplay among the legislative, the executive and 
the judicial power. The Italian Constitution is what is conventionally 
called a ‘rigid’ constitution, since it cannot be changed or repealed 
like any other ordinary statutes: its amendments require a specific 
supermajority in both houses of the Parliament. 
The Constitutional Court is in charge of deciding cases in which 
the consistency with the Constitution of the statutes applicable to 
cases pending before the judiciary is challenged: according to a re-
nowned Italian scholar, ‘More than 50 years of constitutional review 
in Italy have brought about a consolidation of the position of the 
Constitutional Court’,5 even though the occasions when the Court 
has become the target of harsh criticism coming at times by poli-
ticians, other times by the public opinion have multiplied in recent 
years.
The head of state is the President of the Republic, elected for 
a seven years term by the two houses of the Parliament at a joint 
session: he has variety of powers and prerogatives that make his role 
very important, since he ‘represents national unity’ (Article 87, sec. 1 
of the Constitution)6 and is the ultimate guarantor of the Constitution. 
The legislative power is vested with the Parliament that is com-
prised of two chambers, the Chamber of Deputies (Camera dei 
Deputati, in Italian) and the Senate (Senato, in Italian): Article 70 
of the Constitution provides that ‘The law-making function shall be 
exercised collectively by both Houses.’ The two chambers have vir-
tually the same powers, so that one may say that Italy had adopted 
a system of perfect bicameralism, a system that has been repeatedly 
criticized as a source of inefficiency in the process by which bills 
become law in force.
The executive power is entrusted with the Government, which 
includes the Council of Ministers and the President of the Council. 
According to Article 95 of the Constitution, ‘The President of the 
4 C. Pinelli, ‘The 1948 Italian Constitution and the 2006 referendum’, available at ht-
tps://www.scienzegiuridiche.uniroma1.it/sites/default/files/docenti/pinelli/italian-constitu-
tion-2006-referendum.pdf. 
5 T. Groppi, ‘The Italian Constitutional Court: Towards a ‘Multilevel System’ of 
Constitutional Review?’ (2008) 3 J Comp L 100, at 115.
6 All the citations from the Italian Constitution come from its official translation into 
English, which is available on the Senate’s website: https://www.senato.it/application/xmana-
ger/projects/leg18/file/repository/relazioni/libreria/novita/XVII/COST_INGLESE.pdf. 
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Council shall conduct and be accountable for the general policy of 
the Government. The President of the Council shall ensure the con-
sistency of political and administrative policies, by promoting and 
coordinating the activities of Ministers.’
As far as the judiciary is concerned, the Constitutions provides 
that ‘Judicial proceedings shall be exercised by ordinary magis-
trates empowered and regulated by the provisions concerning the 
Judiciary’ (Article 102, sec. 1). A few other constitutional rules are 
worth mentioning in order to give a better view of Italian judiciary. 
Therefore, the judiciary ‘shall be autonomous and independent of 
all other powers’ (Article 104, sec. 1); the recruiting, posting and 
transferring, as well as any decision concerning promotions and the 
infliction of disciplinary measures fall within the jurisdiction of the 
High Council for the Judiciary that is the self-governing body of the 
judiciary, in operation since 1958 (Articles 104 – 107). Ordinary 
judges are recruited through competitive examinations (Article 105); 
once in office they are considered public servants, even though their 
status is surrounded by special guarantees aimed at securing that they 
stay neutral, independent, and impartial.
Ordinary courts have civil jurisdiction and criminal jurisdiction. 
The former comes  into play mainly when disputes between private 
parties must be resolved; the latter is established with the purpose of 
deciding whether or not a person charged with a criminal offence is 
guilty, keeping in mind that in Italy criminal proceedings are instituted 
by a public prosecutor, who is an ordinary judge who performs a few 
specific functions in the framework of criminal trial and, most of all, 
‘shall have the obligation to institute criminal proceedings’ (Article 
112 of the Constitution).7
As far as ordinary courts exercising civil jurisdiction are con-
cerned, the courts of first instance are the justices of the peace (who 
are honorary judges) and the Tribunali: the respective jurisdiction is 
determined according to the amount of money at stake or according 
to the subject matter. Intermediate appeals are brought to the ap-
pellate courts (Corti d’appello) and a final appeal (on points of law 
only) can be lodged with the Italian Supreme Court, the Suprema 
Corte di cassazione.
Justices of the peace and Tribunali have criminal jurisdiction as 
7 See M. Caianiello, ‘The Italian Public Prosecutor: An Inquisitorial Figure in Adversarial 
Proceedings?’ (December 23, 2011), in E. Luna, M. Wade (eds), Transnational Perspectives 
on Prosecutorial Power (Oxford University Press, 2011), available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/
abstract=1976204.
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well, but other criminal courts must be listed. First of all, the ju-
venile courts and the juvenile divisions of the courts of appeal are 
the courts of first and second instance in charge of criminal offences 
perpetrated by minors. Assize courts (Corti di assise) are the courts 
of first instance that try the most serious crimes and are composed 
of six lay judges led by two professional judges. Beside the courts 
of appeal as courts in charge of intermediate appeals, there are the 
Assize courts of appeal (Corti di assise di appello) that hear appeals 
against judgments issued at the first instance level by assize courts. 
The supervisory courts (Tribunali di sorveglianza) and the super-
visory offices (Uffici di sorveglianza) supervise the enforcement 
of prison sentences and the application of the law governing sen-
tences. The Court of cassation acts as final appellate court in criminal 
matters, too.
According to Article 102, sec. 2 of the Constitution, ‘Extraor-
dinary or special judges may not be established. Only specialized 
sections for specific matters within the ordinary judicial bodies may 
be established, and these sections may include the participation of 
qualified citizens who are not members of the Judiciary.’ The Con-
stitution, though, makes an exception for some special courts that 
were already in operation when the Constitution was enacted: these 
courts are the administrative courts, meaning the Council of State as 
a single appellate court and the Regional administrative courts (Tri-
bunali amministrativi regionali), as courts of first instance, as well as 
the Court of Auditors and the military courts (Article 103).
According to the evaluation of judicial systems prepared by the 
European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice (CEPEJ) with 
reference to the data of 2016, in Italy the number of professional 
judges per 100,000.00 inhabitants is 10.6 while in the countries 
that are members of the Council of Europe the median is 18 and the 
average 21. The number of prosecutors per 100,000.00 inhabitants is 
4, while in the countries that are members of the Council of Europe 
the median is 11 and the average 2.8
8 The whole CEPEJ report is available at https://www.coe.int/en/web/cepej/cepej-work/
evaluation-of-judicial-systems.
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Chart 02. Judicial Organization in Italy
If one is inclined to follow the traditional approach taken by 
scholars in comparative law, one can certainly say that the Italian 
legal system belongs to the Civil Law family, because of his his-
torical heritage:9 it is a legal system in which the Roman law legacy 
is still detectable, even though throughout the centuries the influence 
of German and French laws cannot was significant, also due to the 
historical vicissitudes of the country that was unified only in 1861 
under the Kingdom of Italy ruled by the House of Savoy. The fact 
that Italy is a Member State of the European Union has compelled 
the domestic legal system to transpose into the legislation in force 
institutes that are not necessarily in line with the Civil Law roots of 
the Italian legal culture. Furthermore, some traditional feature have 
declined, while new features have acquired remarkable relevance: 
for instance, the importance of what Italians calls ‘the doctrine’ (la 
dottrina, in Italian),10 that is the work of legal scholars, is declining, 
while for centuries it has been considered fundamental for the proper 
interpretation of the law. Precedents are still not listed among the of-
ficial sources of law, but court rulings (most of all, if they are issued 
by the Court of cassation) do have a de facto precedential value; fur-
thermore, expressions strictly connected with the doctrine of stare 
decisis, such as overruling, or anticipatory and perspective over-
ruling have been included as they are (meaning, in English) in the 
9 See extensively L. Moccia, ‘Italian Legal System in the Comparative Law Perspective: 
An Overview’ (1999) 27 Int’l J Leg Info 230.
10 On the role of legal scholarship in Italy, it is still very informative what John Merryman 
wrote in the 1960s: J. H. Merryman, ‘The Italian Style I: Doctrine’ (1965) 18 Stan L Rev 39.
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Italian legal lingo.
In a comparative study on the legal profession in the European 
Union, the situation in Italy is pictured in negative terms: fighting 
a rearguard battle, the Italian legal profession ‘has not undergone a 
fundamental transformation despite the evolution of the international 
market’11 and it is stuck in ‘archaic forms of practice’12 that, for in-
stance, do not allow the establishment of professionals corporations. 
Although one may say that there is some truth in this critical as-
sessment of Italian attorneys as a whole, it seems that the real problem 
with the legal profession in Italy is at present (and has been at least in 
the last decade) the number of lawyers. According to an official report 
published in June 2019,13 the number of attorneys who are members 
of the Bar was 243,488 in 2018, more or less 4 attorneys for every 
1,000 inhabitants. The general opinion is that Italy has too many 
lawyers, and evidence of that can be found in the low average income 
of lawyers: again in 2018, the average income was approximately 
€38,000.00, with sharp differences between geographical areas, so 
that the highest income was registered in the North of the country 
(specifically, in the region called Lombardy) while the lowest one in 
the Southern regions. According to the evaluation of judicial systems 
prepared by the European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice 
(CEPEJ) with reference to the data of 2016, in Italy the number of 
attorneys per 100,000.00 inhabitants is 378.4 while in the countries 
that are members of the Council of Europe the median is 119 and the 
average 162.14
According to Article 24 of the Italian Constitution, ‘Defense is an 
inviolable right at every stage and instance of legal proceedings. The 
poor are entitled by law to proper means for action or defense in all 
courts’. One may argue that this principle grants the legal profession 
a constitutional dimension that makes it stand out from the other 
liberal professions and requires specific rules. As of today, the legal 
profession is governed by a statute passed in 2012, which replaced 
the regulation dating back to 1933. 
The legal profession is decentralized and includes 164 local bar 
councils. The local bar councils are coordinated by the National 
11 K. Gromek-Broc, ‘The Legal Profession in the European Union – A Comparative Analysis 
of Four Member States’ (2002) 24 Liverpool L Rev 109-130, at 126.
12 Ibid., at 128.
13 See Centro Studi Investimenti Sociali – CENSIS, L’avvocato nel quadro di innovazione 
della professione forense – Rapporto 2019 – Roma, giugno 2019, available at  http://www.
censis.it/sites/default/files/downloads/Rapporto%202019_0.pdf 
14 See above, footnote no. 5.
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Bar Council (Consiglio Nazionale Forense, in Italian), which is 
the highest institution of the Italian legal profession. The National 
Bar Council comprises 33 members, all lawyers elected within the 
members of the local bar councils: they stay in office for four years. 
As far as the functions of the National Bar Council are concerned, 
they are both regulatory and disciplinary. An example of the regu-
latory function is the drafting and updating of the Code of Conduct 
for lawyers; the disciplinary function is performed acting as appellate 
court against the judgments issued by the district disciplinary boards 
at the local level for violations of the code of ethics. Judgments given 
by the national Bar Council are subject to a further appeal that can be 
lodge with the Supreme Court of cassation.
The statute governing the legal profession states that attorneys 
(avvocati, in Italian) shall perform their role with independence, 
loyalty, integrity, dignity, diligence and competence, taking into 
account the social importance of defense and abiding by the prin-
ciples of fair and loyal competition.15 Furthermore, attorneys shall 
comply with the rules laid down by the Code of Conduct, rules con-
cerning the relationship between the attorney and his client, the op-
posing party and his attorney, and the court. The Code of Conduct 
provides for a variety of regulations having to do with the different 
functions attorneys can perform. It comprises 73 articles and is 
available in English, too.16
In order to become an attorney, one must earn first a full law 
degree (laurea magistrale a ciclo unico, this being the official de-
nomination of the Juris Doctor degree), followed by a considerably 
long period of traineeship (eighteen months) under the supervision 
of a fully licensed attorney: during the traineeship, the prospective 
attorney is supposed to attend a certain number of court hearings 
with his mentor, and to learn how to draft legal briefs, contracts and 
the like. 
After completion of the mandatory internship, the trainee at-
torney must sit for the State Bar exam, which takes place only once 
a year. The Bar exam includes three written tests: the candidate is 
expected to draft a legal opinion on a civil case, a legal opinion on 
15 Article 3, sec. 2 of Statute no. 247 of 2012. The Italian text reads ‘La professione forense 
deve essere esercitata con indipendenza, lealtà, probità, dignità, decoro, diligenza e competen-
za, tenendo conto del rilievo sociale della difesa e rispettando i principi della corretta e leale 
concorrenza’.




a criminal case and a pleading or brief having to do with a civil, 
criminal or administrative case, according to the Candidate’s choice. 
The written tests are administered in three days in a row; candidates 
have eight hours to complete each test. Those who pass the written 
part of the Bar exam (approximately 30%) must take an oral exam 
on six legal subjects at the candidate’s choice. The chosen subjects, 
though, must include either civil or criminal law and either civil or 
criminal procedure: legal ethics is a mandatory subject, too. 
The Italian legal profession is governed not only by domestic 
rules and regulations, but also by European Union normative in-
struments. Especially important are a few Directives that Italy has 
duly implemented: Council Directive 77/249/EEC of 22 March 1977 
to facilitate the effective exercise by lawyers of freedom to provide 
services; Directive 98/5/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 16 February 1998 to facilitate practice of the profession 
of lawyer on a permanent basis in a Member State other than that in 
which the qualification was obtained;  Directive 2005/36/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 7 September 2005 on the 
recognition of professional qualifications; Directive 2006/123/EC of 
the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 on 
services in the internal market (the so-called Bolkestein Directive).17
To the question whether the general population can afford the 
fees charged by practicing attorneys it is hard to give an educated 
answer. This author was not able to find any recent studies, reports 
or data able to shed light on the affordability of legal fees. Taking 
into account the very low annual income threshold that allows in-
dividuals to apply for legal aid (or, better yet, legal assistance paid 
by the public purse) one can infer that a good number of persons are 
expected to bear personally the expenses of turning to an attorney 
and, as the case may be, starting a judicial proceeding (the annual 
income threshold in question is just below €11,500, meaning corre-
sponds approximately USD 12,760.00). In light of the huge number 
of Italian practicing attorneys, one may assume that there is com-
petition among legal professionals, so that individuals (or, at least, 
those who have limited financial possibilities) may shop around in 
order to find a lawyer who is inclined to charge law fees in order to 
stay afloat: unfortunately, though, low fees are rarely met with high 
quality services.
17 On the influence of European Union regulations on the status of the Italian legal 
profession, see E. Silvestri, ‘The Legal Profession in Italy: Regulation v. Competition?’, in A. 
Uzelac and C. H. van Rhee (eds), The Landscape of the Legal Profession in Europe and the 
USA: Continuity and Change (Intersentia, 2011), 145-159.
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Legal representation is mandatory both in civil and criminal cases. 
In civil cases pro se legal representation is allowed before justices of 
the peace, if the value at stake is below €1,100.00: it is obvious that 
at present nobody would go to court advancing such a small claim. 
In any other civil cases, the assistance of a licensed attorney is man-
datory, including in the preliminary attempts at mediation (that in 
Italy are compulsory for quite a number of cases concerning different 
matters), as well as in the procedures known as assisted negotiation 
(another form of ADR similar to American collaborative practice, 
but  made mandatory for claims up to €50,000.00 and when damages 
caused by traffic accidents are asserted). In criminal proceedings in-
dividuals must always be assisted by counsels of their choice.
Paralegals do not exist in Italy as members of a specific pro-
fession. Law offices, most of all if they consist of a large number 
of attorneys, have one or more legal assistants or legal secretaries 
who perform clerical tasks. Some legal assistants may even hold law 
degrees, but they do not have any particular status, neither can they 
represent a person in court.
3. PROCESS AND PROCEEDINGS: OVERVIEW
3.1. criminaL procedure
Italian criminal proceedings are governed by a code of criminal 
procedure approved in 1988 (the “Code”).  The Code is based on an 
adversarial system and was finalized after a lengthy reform process 
that started after the fall of the fascist regime. The reform had the 
objective, inter alia, to conform Italian criminal procedure to the 
principles of the Italian Constitution and of international human 
rights legislation. Initially, the Code was received cold-heartedly: the 
then prevailing legal sentiment was still influenced by the inquisitive 
system previously in use and was unfavorable to any changes also 
due to the recrudescence of terrorist attacks and mafia-related crimes. 
For this reason, the Code was amended several times, with changes 
which were not always coherent, resulting in a Code that is now sub-
stantially different from its initial version. In brief: the first ten years 
from the introduction of the Code have been characterized by a clear 
reluctance in accepting the new adversarial system, culminated with 
the constitutional “due process” reform, following a few decisions 
issued by the Constitutional Court that essentially demolished the very 
principles of the new codification.  The second decade witnessed the 
introduction of amendments to the Code, which some commentators 
interpreted as deriving from personal interests of political figures 
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representing the majority party then in office (the so-called laws “ad 
personam”). In the last decade the discussion surrounding the Code 
- while also having the objective of refining the protection of funda-
mental rights, following repeated indications coming from European 
authorities - has been and still is oriented at gaining efficiency in 
the administration of justice, clearly slowed down by an unbearable 
workload. A clear sign of such inefficiency is the circumstance that 
a large number of proceedings terminates with the extinction of the 
offence due to the applicable statute of limitation, which results in 
a triple defeat for the justice system: while the accused person is 
kept under the threat of a criminal conviction for an excessive time, 
eventually the aim of the criminal prosecution is not satisfied, nor is 
the interests of the victims of the offence, while public resources are 
wasted in a way the is not cost-effective. Finally, it should be men-
tioned that the evolution of the Code during the last thirty years, as 
briefly summarized above, resulted in a complex system of criminal 
procedure that is increasingly inconsistent and follows different rules 
depending on the type of the criminal offence at hand.  For instance, 
stricter rules apply for applicable measures, investigation deadlines, 
rules of evidence and concerning personal freedom, for terrorism and 
mafia-related crimes.  Also, an increasing request of protection for 
so-called weaker subjects, in line with European directives and inter-
national conventions, resulted in the creation of specific procedural 
rules which apply to a large number of crimes related to personal 
violence.
3.1.1. Criminal investigation process
Italian criminal procedure provides for three levels of judgement. 
The first instance proceeding has a two-step structure contemplating 
first a period of investigation, which precedes the trial. The main 
actor in the preliminary phase is the public prosecutor (“PP”), who 
directs the investigations.  The PP takes care personally the investi-
gations, or, as it is more often the case for the number and quantity 
of the investigative acts, avails herself of the criminal police, which 
operates upon her delegation or within the instructions given by the 
PP.  The principle of objectivity, which applies to the PP as a public 
officer, mandates that the PP must collect all the elements necessary 
for the exercise of the criminal prosecution, including “assessments 
on facts and circumstances which are favorable to the person under 
investigation”.
However, in order to grant equality of arms to the parties also 
during the investigations, the defense lawyers have been granted 
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investigative powers that were not included in the original version 
of the Code, powers which are to a certain extent similar to those 
granted to the PP and the results of which acquire the same value 
recognized to the acts carried out by the PP during the investigation 
phase and the subsequent trial.  Following the enactment of law 7 
December 2000 no. 397, defense attorneys were given ample powers 
as regards   the investigative phase: they can carry out investigations 
in order to search for and find elements of evidence in favor of their 
client ‘starting from the time when they have been granted the pro-
fessional mandate’ (art 327 bis par. 1 CPP).  Defense lawyers may 
proceed with the investigations personally or availing themselves of 
representatives or private investigators (provided that they are duly 
licensed), or experts, should a specific knowledge be required (art. 
327 bis, par. 3 CPP).
The investigations start with the notice of crime, which must be 
recorded in an ad hoc register provided for in art. 335; investigations 
may last up to 18 months or two years in case of particularly serious 
crimes (art. 407 CPP). The person under investigation (hereinafter, 
also referred to as the ‘suspect’) is informed about the existence of 
a proceeding against her only insofar as an act must be carried out 
for which the presence of the defense attorney is necessary (art. 369 
CPP).  Therefore, it is possible that the entire investigation stage is 
carried out without the suspect being informed about the proceeding. 
However, the PP cannot exercise the criminal prosecution without 
first informing the suspect of the investigation in progress, so as to 
grant the suspect the possibility to obtain information regarding the 
acts carried out during the investigation, with a view to taking any 
actions that is useful for her defense (art. 415 bis CPP).  
If during the investigation it is necessary to adopt acts which 
may impact on the rights of the suspect or if the suspect raises a 
complaint, the parties are entitled to approach a judge - the so-called 
preliminary investigations judge (“PIJ”) – who, being an impartial 
authority, is called to offer protection to the fundamental rights of the 
suspect and to ensure that the proceeding is carried out correctly (art 
328 CPP). Among the main duties of the PIJ, in the first place there 
is the power to issue decisions concerning personal rights, property 
rights or the use of assets. For instance, the PIJ can 1) issue interim 
orders affecting personal freedom (art 392 CPP) or similar orders 
concerning assets; 2) confirm the interim measures adopted by the 
PP or the judicial police (art. 391 CPP); 3) authorize acts that have 
an impact on personal correspondence and personal domicile, like 
wiretapping of communications and conversations (art. 267 CPP); 
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4) issue orders concerning the seizure of biological samples (art. 
359-bis, in connection with art. 224 bis CPP); and finally, 5) decide 
on the restitution of seized assets (art 263 CPP).
The PIJ also intervenes to protect the defense rights when there 
are assessments made on the legal capacity of the suspect to take 
part in a proceeding, or to decide whether to suspend the right of the 
suspect under arrest to consult with his attorney (art. 104 par. 3 and 4 
CPP), or in situations when there is an imbalance between the position 
of the PP and that of the defense lawyer. In the latter case, the PIJ may 
for instance: i) authorize the defense lawyer during the defensive in-
vestigations to consult, receive declarations and assume information 
from a person who is under detention (art 391 bis, par. 7 CPP); ii) 
decide on the request of a defense lawyer to obtain documents from 
a public office (art. 391 quarter CPP); and iii) authorize the defense 
lawyer to enter private places or places which are not open to the 
public (art. 391 septies CPP). Finally, when it is necessary to an-
ticipate the acquisition of evidence, the PIJ authorizes it and ensures 
that the evidence is collected in the presence of both parties, issuing 
instructions during the evidence collection (art. 392-402 CPP). 
The PIJ has also certain duties relating to the exercise of the 
criminal prosecution by the PP, exercise which is mandatory. For in-
stance, some  relevant examples are the control powers granted to 
the PIJ as regards  i) the duration of the investigations (art.406-407 
CPP), ii) the conditions for the extension of the investigations (art. 
414, 415, 434 CPP), and iii) the decisions made by the PP at the end 
of the investigations. In this regard, the PIJ decides upon both the 
PP’s dismissal order (art. 409) and the PP’s request for trial (art. 416 
CPP). Finally, the PIJ (or the judge of the preliminary hearing, as the 
case might be) acts as the deciding judge in the event that the parties 
choose one of the so-called alternative procedures, for instance when 
a) the PP requests the issuance of a criminal decree (art. 461 CPP); b) 
the parties have agreed upon the application of a sanction (art. 444); 
or c) the accused person has requested an abbreviated decision, at the 
preliminary hearing (art. 438 and following) or after the conversion 
of the immediate proceeding pursuant to art. 458 or the accused 
person has requested the suspension of the prison sentence with pro-
bation (art. 464 bis and ff CPP.).
The suspect may be arrested by the criminal police, normally 
only in flagrante delicto. The PP must be informed of the arrest 
within 24 hours and within the following 24 hours he must request 
the PIJ to confirm the arrest. The PIJ has 48 hours to decide. Failure 
to comply with the above deadlines results in the invalidation of the 
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arrest and the obligation to release immediately the person under in-
vestigation. The arrest may be ordered by the PP, also in the absence 
of an in flagrante delicto, when (1) ‘there are specific elements 
making it probable that the suspect may flee, also in relation to the 
impossibility to determine the identity of the suspect’, and (2) there 
are serious elements indicating that a crime has been committed. The 
crime must be (a) one for which the law provides for life prison or 
for a prison term of at least two years as minimum sentence and in 
excess of six years as maximum sentence, or (b) a crime concerning 
weapons of war, explosives, terrorism, or eversion of the democratic 
order (art. 384 CPP). 
Restriction of personal freedom can be ordered by the PIJ upon 
request by the PP, pursuant to art. 274, in the following cases: 1) 
when there is the need to protect the acquisition of evidence; 2) in 
case of a probable flight of the suspect; and 3) when serious crimes 
are otherwise likely  to be committed in light of particular factual 
circumstances.  The suspect may challenge the arrest order (art. 
309-311 CPP) and request that the arrest is re-evaluated because the 
underlying conditions have changed (art. 299 CPP). The terms of the 
arrest vary depending on the gravity of the offence and may range 
between 6 months and one year of imprisonment (art. 303 CPP).  
Following the investigations, the PP must choose between a dis-
missal and the exercise of the criminal prosecution. If the PP has col-
lected sufficient evidence in order to proceed with a request for trial, 
the PP must exercise the criminal prosecution. Only in the absence 
of sufficient evidence, that is, when the notice of the crime is found 
to be groundless, the PP must request the dismissal.  The PP must 
decide based on technical requirements, since her decision cannot be 
based on considerations of opportunity.
Chart 03. The preliminary investigation
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3.1.2. Criminal prosecution proceedings
As indicated before, the criminal prosecution is mandatory: 
pursuant to art. 112 Cost., upon receipt of a notice of crime, the PP 
must start the criminal prosecution. The PP is also the only party 
which is responsible for the action. The person offended by the crime 
has no role in such respect, except in the case of certain minor of-
fences that cannot be prosecuted without a formal request filed by the 
offended party. 
The criminal prosecution is eventually exercised with the formu-
lation of the accusation in the forms provided for by law, in particular 
pursuant to art. 405, which lists the request for trial and certain alter-
native simplified procedures. 
The request for trial (art. 416 CPP) leads to the preliminary 
hearing, during which the judge must evaluate whether or not the 
conditions for starting the trial exist. The preliminary hearing may be 
unnecessary when there is sufficient evidence of the crime already in 
the first phase of the investigations. In such case, when the relevant 
conditions apply, the PP may exercise the criminal prosecution, 
asking the PIJ to proceed with a so-called immediate trial, or taking 
the accused person directly before the trial judge (the so-called direct 
trial). 
At trial, which is public and carried out according to the principles 
of orality and unity, the evidence is normally taken in the presence of 
the parties, but some exceptions exist, coherently with the provisions 
of art. 111 fifth par. Cost., (consent expressed by the accused person, 
unequivocal evidence, impossibility of collecting the evidence for 
objective reasons). The trial should also be carried out in compliance 
with the principle of concentration, thus ideally completed within 
one day or, if this is not possible, it should continue on the following 
business day: however, the current workload of courts makes this 
rule one of the least observed by judges.
The problem of proceedings in absentia has been resolved since 
2014. After an evolution started by European case-law, which lasted 
for a decade, with law no. 67 of 28 April 2014, the Parliament has 
repealed from the Code the possibility of proceedings in absentia, 
except in specific cases. The judge will now proceed without the 
presence of the suspect when the latter, whether free or under arrest, 
has expressly renounced (art. 420-bis par. 1 CPP), or when there is 
evidence that the suspect has knowledge of the proceeding or there 
is a legal presumption of such knowledge (art. 420-bis par. 2 CPP). 
Such presumption exists when the suspect has declared or elected do-
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micile or has been arrested, detained or under precautionary measures 
or has appointed a defense attorney, as well as when the suspect who 
is absent has received personally the notice of the hearing  or there is 
certain evidence that the offender is aware of the proceeding or has 
voluntarily avoided the official notification of the proceeding or of 
acts thereof. When the proceeding is in absentia, the suspect is rep-
resented by her defense attorney.  Depending on the gravity and the 
type of the crime, the competent judge will be the Court of Assize, 
the Tribunal (composed by either one or three judges) or the Justice 
of the Peace, the latter being an honorary judge who can decide only 
upon minor crimes.
The PIJ (or the judge for the preliminary hearing, depending on 
the circumstances) is the trial judge for alternative procedures such 
as the simplified trial (art. 438-443 CPP), the ‘settlement procedure’ 
(art. 444-448 CPP), the criminal decree (art. 459-464 CPP), and the 
suspension with probation (art. 464 bis-464 novies CPP). These are 
procedures which imply the granting of certain benefits against con-
cessions by the accused person. Generally, a material reduction of 
the sentence and additional benefits are granted: for instance, the 
judge cannot apply ancillary sanctions and precautionary measures, 
the accused person will not pay the costs of the proceeding and will 
be entitled to the extinction of the crime if certain terms are met; the 
decision will not be mentioned in the judicial records. All that, if the 
accused person waives certain defense rights of hears. 
Following the first instance decision, the offender and the PP 
(and, under the circumstances, also the damaged parties exercising 
an action for damages, as well as the party responsible for damages 
if different from the accused person), have the right to file an appeal 
against any types of decision.  The decision issued on appeal can be 
challenged through a motion to the Court of cassation, which can be 
filed solely for issues of law, for the reasons listed in art 606 CPP. 
The right to appeal is granted in very ample terms and the de-
cision becomes binding and final only when no further challenges 
other than the so-called revision are available to the convicted person. 
The rules concerning the right to appeal criminal decisions are the 
principal aspect that the government will have to take into account 
in the near future.  It should be noted that the practical experience 
shows an abuse of appeals by convicted persons, who aim at delaying 
the enforcement of the conviction and often, with the passing of time, 
the extinction of the crime due to the rules on the statutes of limi-
tation, and therefore impunity.  The fact that up to 70 per cent of the 
appeals brought to the Court of cassation are declared inadmissible 
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confirms that many challenges are abusive.
One should also note that even after decisions become final 
and binding, the convicted person can start a revision proceeding, 
meaning an extraordinary action that can be resorted to when new 
facts contrary to the findings of the proceeding emerge or when the 
decision must be made in agreement with a final judgment issued 
by the European Court of Human Rights, pursuant to art. 46 par. 1 
ECHR.
There are no duration limitations applicable to the criminal 
proceeding but, as already observed, it happens often that the pro-
ceedings ends with a dismissal due to the extinction of the crime: the 
Code provides that the accused person cannot be convicted when a 
certain number of years have elapsed from the time when the crime 
was perpetrated (it is irrelevant when the commission of the crime 
becomes known to the authorities). 
During the proceeding, the offender can be subject to precau-
tionary arrest for the same reasons described above with respect to 
the investigations phase (art. 273 and art. 274 CPP).  Limitations to 
the duration of the arrest are provided for, depending on the gravity 
of the crime, for each phase of the proceeding (art. 803 par. 1). Fur-
thermore, an overall maximum term is contemplated, also depending 
on the gravity of the crime: the accused person will have the right to 
be released if the proceeding is not completed within 2, 4 or 6 years, 
depending on the crime (art. 303 par. 4 CPP).
Chart 04. Trial and special proceedings
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Chart 05. Appellate Remedies
3.1.3. Italian criminal procedure and due process
The Italian criminal procedure is based on the principle of ‘due 
process of law’: mandatory exercise of the criminal prosecution, in-
dependent and impartial judges, presumption of innocence and an 
inviolable right of defense at any stage of the proceeding are some 
of the principles adopted by the Code, and  also embedded in our 
Constitution.  
Guarantees of context (right to defend oneself through legal as-
sistance, equal rights between the PP and the defense lawyer, im-
partiality of the judge and reasonable duration of proceedings) and 
rights essentially corresponding to the basket of rights provided for 
by art. 6 par. 3 ECHR are specifically granted to the accused person. 
The Code provides that the person who is accused of a crime in the 
shortest possible time shall be informed, on a  confidential basis, of 
the nature and the reasons of the accusations raised and be granted 
the time and the conditions which are necessary for preparing her 
defenses, and have the right before the judge to question or have 
questions raised to the persons making declarations against her and to 
obtain the calling and the interrogation of the persons to her defense 
with the same rights and conditions as the PP, and the acquisition 
of any other evidence in her favor; to be assisted by an interpreter 
if she does not speak or understand the language spoken within the 
proceeding.  Besides, the Italian Constitution and the Code must be 
read in conjunction with the provisions of international conventions, 
which are an integral part of the Italia legal system.
In any case, it is true that, notwithstanding the ample guarantees 
that characterize our system, in practice the Italian criminal pro-
ceeding is still too slow.  For this reason, proposals for the reform 
of criminal procedure insist on measures of decriminalization, as 
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well as on measures for procedural simplification and for the search 
of alternatives to criminal prosecution.  The reform of appeal rights 
is another area to be taken into consideration for the future, for the 
reasons mentioned above.
3.2. civiL procedure
Civil procedure is mainly regulated by the Code of civil pro-
cedure, which dates back to 1940 and entered into force in 1942.18 
One may wonder whether the fact that the Code was adopted during 
the Fascist era had a strong bearing on its content and, as a matter of 
facts, some scholars believe that the Code upheld an authoritarian 
model of civil justice, centered on a strong and powerful judge, the 
real ‘master of the game’, while the parties played a secondary role. 
Whatever the drafters of the original text of the Code had in mind, it 
is necessary to emphasize that the Code has gone through countless 
amendments and additions that only its appearance (that is to say, 
for instance, its division into four books) has remained the same. 
A variety of judicial procedures that can be loosely qualified as be-
longing to what is conventionally called ‘civil justice’ are located 
outside the code, being provided for by special statutes, many of 
which carry their label of origin in European law, either directly ap-
plicable in the Member States or to be implemented via domestic 
statutes. Last but not least, the advent of the Constitution (in 1948) 
and the active involvement of the Constitutional Court in repealing 
quite a number of procedural rules deemed at odds with fundamental 
principles have established the unwritten rule according to which 
procedural rules (as well as substantive ones) must be given a con-
stitutionally oriented interpretation by the courts that are supposed to 
apply them.
As explained above, at the first instance level civil and com-
mercial jurisdiction pertains to either the justices of the peace or to 
the Tribunali. Justices of the peace have jurisdiction when the value 
at stake is below €5,000.00, but the threshold is higher (€20,000.00) 
when damages caused by traffic accidents are sought. Justices of the 
peace have also a limited subject matter jurisdiction. Tribunali have 
18 On Italian civil procedure, see in general M. A. Lupoi, Civil Procedure in Italy 3 (Wolters 
Kluwer 2018); E. Silvestri, ‘Italy: Civil Procedure in Crisis’, in C. H. van Rhee, F. Yulin (eds), 
Civil Litigation in China and Europe. Essays on the Role of the Judge and the Parties (Springer 
2014) 235-255; E. Silvestri, ‘Goals of Civil Justice When Nothing Works: The Case of Italy’, in 
A. Uzelac (ed.), Goals of Civil Justice and Civil Procedure in Contemporary Judicial Systems 
(Springer 2014) 79-103; M. A. Lupoi, ‘Recent Developments in Italian Civil Procedure’ (2012) 
3 Civil Procedure Rev., 25-51.
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jurisdiction over cases exciding the threshold mentioned above and 
exclusive jurisdiction over specific matters (e.g., personal status and 
family matters, as well as enforcement procedures). Complex rules 
have to be applied in order to determine the proper venue so as to 
choose the court where to initiate litigation. Under Italian law, juris-
diction (giurisdizione) and venue (competenza territoriale) are im-
portant issues on which the court can rule at the outset of litigation, 
causing – as the case may be – the dismissal of the action.
Within each Tribunale cases are heard either by a single judge 
or by a three-judge panel. Nowadays, the majority of cases are dealt 
with by a single judge; in the small number of cases entrusted to a 
three-judge panel (e.g., cases arising out of bankruptcy law or the 
law of decedent’s estate), one judge is in charge of the whole devel-
opment of the proceeding and reports to the other two members of 
the panel with a view of issuing the final judgment.
Before the Tribunali, the ordinary procedure can be divided into 
three stage: the introductory stage; the evidence taking stage; and the 
decision stage. 
As far as the introductory stage is concerned, a civil action begins 
when the plaintiff serves a statement of claim on the defendant. The 
statement of claim (in Italia, atto di citazione) must include a list of 
mandatory elements, such as the cause of action and the material 
facts supporting the cause of action, as well as the relief sought, and 
the evidence and the documents that the plaintiff intends to use to 
prove his allegations. In his answer, the defendant must ‘put forward 
all his defenses and take a stand on the material facts advanced by 
the plaintiff in support of his cause of action’ (Article 167, sec. 1 of 
the Code of civil procedure, my translation). The answer must list the 
evidence and the documents that the defendant intends to use in order 
to oppose the plaintiff’s contentions.
Concepts such as pre-trial phase, pre-trial discovery and trial are 
alien to the language of Italian civil procedure, since adjudication 
develops along a variable number of hearings that are self-contained 
‘episodes’, and have no continuity at all, if only because hearings, 
as a rule, are far too spaced out.  The first hearing is particularly 
important, since at this hearing the parties are entitled to ‘line up 
the shot’ by clarifying and modifying their allegations. At the same 
hearing the court rules on the admissibility of the evidence offered 
by the parties.
As far as the evidence taking is concerned, it is worth empha-
sizing that in principle the court must rely only on the evidence 
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offered by the parties in support of the factual allegations they have 
made in their pleadings. This general rule (laid down by Article 115, 
sec. 1 of the Code) has some exceptions that apply only insofar as 
there is a legal rule granting the court the power to take evidence ex 
officio. This happens for instance in the procedure followed in labor 
cases, as well as in certain non-contentious proceedings. 19
Evidence must be not only admissible, but also relevant for the 
case at hand. Evidence is relevant when it has a logical connection 
with the facts in dispute, so that it allows to establish whether or not 
these very facts are true. 
One may say that the probative weight of each piece of ad-
missible evidence can be placed in a theoretical hierarchy: at the 
top there is documentary evidence and, in particular, the so-called 
public deeds (atti pubblici, in Italian), which are documents drafted 
and signed by notaries public or other public authorities entrusted 
with the power to grant ‘public faith’ to the documents they draw 
up. The probative value of public deeds, private writings and other 
documents are governed by complex rules that are common to the 
majority of continental European legal systems having roots in the 
Civil Law tradition. Out of curiosity, one must mention the fact that 
among admissible evidence the Italian laws in force still list the oath 
and the confession.20 The new forms of evidence connected with the 
development of modern IT are subject to regulations laid down by 
special statutes.
Testimony refers solely to statements made in court by third 
parties (witnesses): this means that neither the statements made by 
the parties nor expert opinions are considered testimony. As far as 
experts are concerned, they are considered auxiliary officers of the 
court.
According to Article 116, sec. 1 of the Code, ‘The court must 
evaluate the evidence in accordance with its prudent judgment, 
except as otherwise provided by the law’ (my translation). Scholars 
emphasize the adjective ‘prudent’ evaluation, in order to signify 
that a free evaluation of evidence must not cross into an arbitrary 
or capricious assessment, in light of the fact that courts are bound to 
19 See E. Silvestri, ‘Evidence in Civil Procedure in Italy, available at https://pf.um.si/site/
assets/files/3223/evidence_in_civil_law_-_italy.pdf.
20 See E. Silvestri, ‘The Antique Shop of Italian Civil Procedure: Oath and Confession as 
Evidence’, in C. H. van Rhee and A. Uzelac (eds), Truth and Efficiency in Civil Litigation. 
Fundamental Aspects of Fact-Finding and Evidence-Taking in a Comparative Context 
(Intersentia 2012) 47-58. 
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expound on the reasons that led them to accept or reject the evidence 
in the judgments they issue. Exceptions to the rule just mentioned 
concern what Italians call ‘legal evidence’ (prova legale in Italian): 
legal evidence is evidence whose probative value is pre-determined 
by the law. ‘Legal evidence’ includes in general certain types of doc-
umentary evidence, party admissions, and conclusive presumptions.
When the evidence taking stage is over, the parties are expected 
to lodge with the court their final briefs (in Italian, comparse con-
clusionali and memorie di replica), in which they summarize all the 
factual and legal arguments that the parties want the court to take 
into account. Oral argument takes place rarely and only if a party so 
requests.  
The judgment is immediately enforceable (which means, in case 
of a money judgment, that the creditor can begin the appropriate en-
forcement procedure). Italian decisions must always lay down the 
facts in dispute and the legal principles applied by the court in order 
to arrive at the judgment, since one of the canons of due process is, 
according to the Italian Constitutions, the rule according to which 
‘All judicial decisions shall include a statement of reasons’ (Article 
111, sec. 6).
Even when the case is decided by a three-judge panel, the only 
opinion that counts and has legal value is the majority opinion. Neither 
concurring nor dissenting opinions are contemplated by Italian law.
As far as the procedure before the justices of peace is concerned, 
the pattern followed is more or less the same as the procedure before 
the Tribunali with a few simplifications that do not seem worth 
mentioning.
With reference to case management, one must emphasize that 
the concept of case management is alien to Italian civil procedure. 
Italian litigation still advances through an endless series of hearings 
scattered over an unpredictable time period, so that it is fair to say 
that the concept of a real preparatory stage is wishful thinking, devoid 
of any practical application. That being the situation, it should not 
come as a surprise that judicial case management is terra incognita. 
On the contrary, what is surprising is the fact that, according to the 
Code of Civil Procedure, the court ‘is entrusted with all the powers 
necessary for the swift and fair development of the proceeding’, in-
cluding the power ‘to set deadlines for the completion of procedural 
steps’ (Article 175, sections 1 and 2; my translation). Furthermore, 
the court also has the power to impose sanctions on the parties and 
their lawyers when they have breached the duty to conduct litigation 
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with fairness and integrity (Article 88). Therefore, it is clear that, ac-
cording to the procedural rules in force, Italian courts could resort to 
at least minimal case management. In reality, though, that does not 
occur. essentially because caseloads are very heavy and courts are 
understaffed. The combination of these two curses that the Italian 
justice system is unable to dispel makes it impossible for the judges 
to properly study each case, as would be necessary for a sound ex-
ercise of case management powers. There have been recent attempts 
at improving the situation, for instance through the establishment of 
the so-called ‘ufficio per il processo’ (which can be roughly translated 
as ‘office for the proceeding’), which increases the judicial staff by 
the addition of law clerks (typically, young law graduates) or lay 
judges and other persons who are supposed to help judges navigate 
the sea of documents, briefs and other kinds of papers that make up 
the courts’ dockets and to decipher the mysteries of online justice (a 
recent feature of Italian civil justice). 
Beyond the practical realities there are essentially ideological 
barriers preventing any attempt at reforming the Code of Civil Pro-
cedure in the direction of envisioning a structured and non-episodic 
case management, as well as the possibility for the court to adjust 
the procedure according to a standard of proportionality. According 
to a widespread school of thought, to grant judges broad case man-
agement powers would mean to inject an authoritarian note into civil 
procedure. In order to understand this curious idea, one should revisit 
the history of the Code of Civil Procedure in force. The Code was 
adopted in 1940, and the fact that courts were entrusted powers al-
lowing them to play an active role in the development of proceedings 
was later seen as the sign of a ‘fascist’, authoritarian approach to 
litigation. That is why any idea of granting more powers to courts 
is often met with a good measure of skepticism, if not open hos-
tility. As often is the case, misconceptions stem from ignorance, and 
even in the case of the Code and the powers granted to courts an 
accurate reading of the Report accompanying the original text of the 
Code would be illuminating. The Report shows how the drafters of 
the Code anticipated ideas that would become popular much later. 
In their concept of the dynamics of civil justice, the divide between 
an inquisitorial model of adjudication and a proceeding molded by 
the judge according to the specific needs of the case at hand was 
clear. To dictate a single, rigid procedure applicable to each and any 
case – the Report reads – neither satisfies the need for an accurate 
finding of the facts (which is necessary most of all in complex cases) 
nor does it grant an expedited disposition of cases (which is a need 
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particularly felt when a case is simple or requires an urgent reso-
lution). Therefore, it is necessary to organize the development of ad-
judication according to the principles of adaptability and flexibility: 
the court, assisted by the parties, should adapt the procedure to the 
specific features of the case, so as to obtain the highest possible level 
of procedural economy. 
Even though the advent of case management in Italian civil pro-
cedure cannot be foreseen at least in the near future, mention has to 
be made of a relatively new type of first instance proceeding that was 
introduced in 2009 and advances, modestly, the cause of a mana-
gerial treatment of cases. Reference here is to the so-called ‘summary 
proceeding’ (in Italian, procedimento sommario di cognizione) that 
can be chosen by the claimant if certain requirements are met. From 
the point of view of judicial case management, the summary pro-
cedure is very interesting, since the court, ‘taking into account the 
introductory pleading and having heard the parties, can decide how 
the case will develop, dispensing with any formalities that are not es-
sential to safeguarding the due process rights of the parties’ (Article 
702 ter, sec. 5 of the Code; my translation). Therefore, the court can 
adapt the procedure to the needs of the case with a flexible approach 
that is the exact opposite of the rigid approach typical of the structure 
of the ordinary first instance proceeding. Unfortunately, the summary 
proceeding has not been very successful in practice, for a variety of 
reasons that cannot be explained here and now. In spite of that, a 
variety of bills pending before the Parliament for the (umpteenth) 
reform of the Code of Civil Procedure provides for a generalization 
of the summary proceeding, which would become the basic model of 
proceedings before first instance courts. 
As regards provisional or interim remedies (in Italian, provved-
imenti cautelari), the Code of civil procedure, as well as a number of 
special statutes, provide for different types of provisional remedies. 
According to a traditional, but still sound explanation, three possible 
situations justify the request for a provisional measure: when it is 
highly foreseeable that a judgment will remain unsatisfied; when it is 
necessary to protects the rights of the parties while an ordinary pro-
ceeding is pending; and when there is the need to preserve evidence, 
which could go missing or  be destroyed or, in general, could become 
unavailable21  
Interim measures can be requested before the commencement of 
21 See M. Cappelletti & J. M. Perillo, Civil Procedure in Italy (Martinus Nijhof 1965), 
130-143.
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a civil law suit (in Italian, we talk about provvedimenti cautelari ante 
causam) or when litigation is pending. The procedure is governed by 
a set of rules laid down by the Code of civil procedure: these rules 
are known as ‘the uniform procedure for interim measures’ (my free 
translation of the Italian ‘procedimento cautelare uniforme’: Articles 
669-bis – 669-quaterdecies of the Code). On their turn, these rules 
are supplemented by other rules that govern individual provisional 
measures.
It is conventional to distinguish between protective measures 
and anticipatory measures. The formers are aimed at preserving the 
status quo during the development of judicial proceedings or at pre-
serving property in order to guarantee the satisfaction of a future 
money judgment. The latter anticipate the effects of a final judgment. 
Protective measures always require an action on the merits to be in-
stituted within a specific deadline: should this condition not be sat-
isfied; the measure automatically loses its effects. Differently, antici-
patory measures do not need the support of a judgment on the merits; 
their effects survive whether or not an adjudication on the merits 
ensues, even though they cannot be relied upon as a final judgment 
that settles the issues in dispute with res judicata authority.
Interim measures are specific, meaning that each one is available 
only if certain requirements are met. In spite of that, when there is 
a danger of imminent and irreparable injury and no specific interim 
measures are available, the court may grant an ‘urgent measure’ 
(provvedimento d’urgenza, in Italian: Article 700 of the Code) whose 
content can be shaped so as to ensure in advance the future effects 
of a decision on the merits. That said, for the granting of all provi-
sional measures two requirements must be met: the fumus boni juris, 
meaning that the applicant must show a credible cause of action, and 
the periculum in mora, which exists when it is reasonable to believe 
that, while the applicant is waiting for a judgment on the merits, the 
right for whose protection the provisional measure is sought will be 
subject to irreparable damage.
Italy has a chronic problem with the excessive length of judicial 
proceedings, whether civil, criminal or administrative. At July 1, 
2019, a total of 3,425 Italian applications were pending before the 
European Court of Human Rights:22 a high percentage of applications 
concerns the violation of Article 6, sec. 1 of the ECHR insofar as it 
provides for a reasonable duration of judicial proceedings. The extent 
22 For this piece of information, see https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/CP_Italy_ENG.
pdf. 
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of the problem is such that it is not possible to mention the countless 
Interim Resolutions issued by the Committee of Ministers at the 
Council of Europe, neither does it make any sense to elaborate, on 
the one hand, on the causes of the problem and, on the other hand, 
on the various attempts made through law reform with a view to ex-
pediting the pace of justice.  A few excerpts from selected judgments 
can elucidate the situation better than a scholarly recount.
In Scordino v. Italy (2006),23 the Court said:
‘It feels it important to point out that the reason it has 
been led to rule on so many length-of-proceedings 
cases is because certain Contracting Parties have for 
years failed to comply with the “reasonable time” re-
quirement under Article 6 § 1 and have not provided a 
domestic remedy for this type of complaint.
The situation has worsened on account of the large 
number of cases coming from certain countries, of 
which Italy is one. The Court has already had occasion 
to stress the serious difficulties it has had as a result 
of Italy’s inability to resolve the situation. It has ex-
pressed itself on the subject in the following terms:
“The Court next draws attention to the fact that 
since 25 June 1987, the date of the Capuano v. Italy 
judgment (Series A no. 119), it has already delivered 
65 judgments in which it has found violations of 
Article 6 § 1 in proceedings exceeding a “reasonable 
time” in the civil courts of the various regions of Italy. 
Similarly, under former Articles 31 and 32 of the Con-
vention, more than 1,400 reports of the Commission 
resulted in resolutions by the Committee of Ministers 
finding Italy in breach of Article 6 for the same reason.
The frequency with which violations are found shows 
that there is an accumulation of identical breaches 
which are sufficiently numerous to amount not merely 
to isolated incidents. Such breaches reflect a con-
tinuing situation that has not yet been remedied and 
in respect of which litigants have no domestic remedy.
This accumulation of breaches accordingly constitutes 
a practice that is incompatible with the Convention.” 
(see Bottazzi v. Italy [GC], no. 34884/97, § 22, ECHR 
1999V; Ferrari v. Italy [GC], no. 33440/96, § 21, 28 
July 1999; A.P. v. Italy [GC], no. 35265/97, § 18, 28 
July 1999; and Di Mauro v. Italy [GC], no. 34256/96, 
§ 23, ECHR 1999-V)’.
23 Scordino v. Italy, https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{“itemid”:[“001-72925”]}, §§ 174-175.
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More recently, in Zullo v. Italy (2006), the Court emphasized 
again that
‘[…] A domestic remedy has been introduced [in the 
Italian law in force]. However, that has not changed the 
substantive problem, namely, the fact that the length 
of proceedings in Italy continues to be excessive. The 
annual reports of the Committee of Ministers on the 
excessive length of judicial proceedings in Italy (see, 
inter alia, CM/Inf/DH(2004)23 revised, and Interim 
Resolution ResDH(2005)114) scarcely seem to reflect 
substantial changes in this area. Like the applicant, the 
Court does not see how the introduction of the Pinto 
remedy at domestic level has solved the problem of 
excessively lengthy proceedings. [Omissis]. The Court 
emphasises once again that Article 6 § 1 of the Con-
vention obliges the Contracting States to organise 
their legal systems so as to enable the courts to comply 
with its various requirements. It wishes to reaffirm the 
importance of administering justice without delays 
which might jeopardise its effectiveness and credi-
bility. Italy’s position in this regard has not changed 
sufficiently to call into question the conclusion that 
this accumulation of breaches constitutes a practice 
that is incompatible with the Convention.’24
The domestic remedy mentioned in Zullo v. Italy is a special 
procedure provided for by statute no. 89 of 24 March 2001 with 
a view to granting litigants the right to claim damages (before 
appellate courts) in case of excessively lengthy court proce-
edings. A reform of the procedure in 2012 set the maximum 
length of proceedings at six years. Unfortunately, the so-called 
‘Pinto remedy’ has not been successful: to the contrary, the cure 
has turned out to be worse than the disease, so to say, since 
throughout the years the statute has brought about additional 
litigation and huge costs for the national budget.
3.3. aLternative dispute resoLution
Italy has unconditionally embraced the gospel of ADR. The 
reasons are not ideological, but only practical: ADR schemes carried 
24 Zullo v. Italy, https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{“fulltext”:[“zullo”],”documentcollectioni-
d2”:[“GRANDCHAMBER”,”CHAMBER”],”itemid”:[“001-72934”]}, §§ 120-121.
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with them the promise of a reduction in the heavy courts’ caseload. 
The belief that ADR could save Italian civil justice from collapsing 
under an over-growing number of judicial proceedings was so strong 
that a few ADR methods were made mandatory, that is to say that 
they are compulsory steps that parties must take prior to being 
allowed to appear before the court. This is the case of mediation and 
assisted negotiation. As far as mediation is concerned, the Italian leg-
islators provided for it in 2010 via implementation of EU Directive 
2008/52/EC on certain aspects of mediation in civil and commercial 
cases. From the outset, mediation was made mandatory in a variety 
of cases; due to a strong opposition from lawyers’ associations, the 
rules on the duty to attempt mediation before regaining the right to 
access the court ended up before the Constitutional Court. Mandatory 
mediation was declared at odds with the Constitution, but only for a 
formal quibble, which allowed the Parliament to reinstate mandatory 
mediation soon afterward.25 Therefore, at present, the Italian legal 
system provides for three types of mediation: voluntary mediation, 
devoid of any practical relevance; mandatory mediation, in a long 
list of disputes concerning matters such as property rights, trust and 
real estate, landlord and tenant disputes, banking and financial con-
tracts, just to mention a few examples; and mediation ordered by 
the court at any stage of the proceeding, not only before a court of 
first instance, but while the appellate procedure is pending as well. A 
peculiar feature of Italian mandatory mediation is that parties must 
appear in front of the mediator with their own attorneys. In other 
words, legal representation is conceived as always necessary and not 
optional, in spite of the conventional wisdom according to which in 
mediation parties should work together so as to try themselves to put 
an end to their dispute, working out an agreement that is suitable for 
both. 
Assisted negotiation vaguely resembles the American collab-
orative law, but a fundamental difference must be emphasized. The 
attorneys assisting the parties during the negotiation do not face any 
ethical impediments preventing them from representing the same 
parties in court, if the negotiation fails. This means that they have 
no incentives to work so as to help the parties reach a settlement. 
Assisted negotiation is mandatory when damages caused by traffic 
accidents are claimed and for any case in which the amount at stake 
is above €50,000.00.
25 On the vicissitudes of mandatory mediation, see E. Silvestri and R. Jagtenberg), 
‘Tweeluik-Dyptych: Juggling a Red Hot Potato: Italy, the EU, and Mandatory Mediation’ 
(2013) 17 Netherlands-Vlaams Tijschrift voor Mediation en Conflictmanagement 29-38.
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Other ADR schemes have been introduced though the implemen-
tation of another European Directive, meaning Directive 2013/11/
EU on alternative dispute resolution for consumer disputes. These 
schemes are specifically designated to simplify access to justice for 
consumers and users; along the same lines, one must mention the 
availability of a special online platform for the disputes arising out 
of transactions that took place in the so-called ‘marketplaces’: the 
platform has been established by EU Regulation no. 524 of 2013. 
Finally, a number of special statutes addressing specific subject 
matters (telecommunications, tourist services, just to offer the reader 
a couple of examples) provide for either voluntary or mandatory at-
tempts at conciliation or mediation, not to mention the special ADR 
bodies established for the amicable resolution of disputes in the 
domain of banking law, insurance, derivatives, commercial banking, 
capital markets and investment management. One may say that 
probably even in the field of ADR methods a serious simplification 
would be necessary: as they say, ‘less is more’, even in the field of 
access to justice, when ‘more’ only means a variety of ADR methods 
that overlap and make it difficult for ordinary people to figure out 
which one is the best suited for their needs. 26 
3.4. simpLiFication oF Law and by-passinG LeGaL process
No special, simplified procedures exist for the resolution of 
small claims. In 2014 new rules for the separation of spouses and 
the divorce were introduced, allowing the parties to resort to a semi-
administrative procedure that does not contemplate, in principle, any 
judicial involvement.
In exceptional circumstances as provided for by specific rules, 
courts can issue decisions that are not based on the law in force, but 
on principles and criteria that take into account the peculiar aspects 
of the case at stake. The Italian expression by which this hypothesis 
is identified is known as ‘giudizio di equità’. The term ‘equità’ is 
difficult to translate, since the English ‘equity’ is only an acoustic 
similarity. Often, in order to explain what ‘equità’ means Latin ex-
pressions are used, such as (judgment) ‘secundum conscientiam’ or 
(judgment) ‘ex aequo et bono’. In any event, the only significant 
cases decided dispensing with the applicable legal rules are those 
decided by justices of the peace when the amount at stake does not 
exceed €2,500.00 (Article 113 of the Code of civil procedure).
26 See E. Silvestri, ‘Too Much of a Good Thing: Alternative Dispute Resolution in Italy’ 
(2017) 21 Netherlands-Vlaams Tijschrift voor Mediation en Conflictmanagement 29-38. 
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4. ACCESS TO JUSTICE, EQUAL ACCESS TO COURT AND 
FAIR TRIAL
The right for everyone to access to court, to receive legal as-
sistance and a fair trial is granted in Italy by virtue of both interna-
tional and national law.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), in his 
Article 8 grants the right to an effective remedy by the competent 
national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted to 
everyone by the Constitution or by law and, in Article 10, it grants a 
fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal for 
everyone, in full equality, in the determination of his right and obli-
gations and of any criminal charge against him.
The European Convention on Human Rights (1950) is more 
precise, recognizing not only an equal right in accessing the courts 
and the right to an effective remedy in case of violation of the Con-
vention (article 13), but also the right to “legal assistance of his own 
choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, 
to be given it free when the interests of justice so required” (article 
6 c): this principle was originally limited only to criminal cases, but 
later on it was extended to non-criminal cases as well by the case 
law of the European Court of Human Rights, inferring it from the 
right to a fair trial. More or less the same is established also in the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966, Article 
14, particularly para. 3 d).
The Charter of Fundamental Rights on Freedoms of the European 
Union (2000, revised in 2007, and binding from 2009) grants a fair 
trial and the right to legal aid, which “shall be made available to 
those who lack sufficient resources in so far as such aid is necessary 
to ensure effective access to justice”, without making any distinction 
between criminal and non-criminal cases (Article 47).
The implementation and enforcement of all these international 
treaties takes place primarily at the national level. In particular, 
Article 4 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) requires EU 
Member States to take appropriate measures in order to ensure the 
fulfillment of obligations arising out of EU law. This is the so-called 
principle of sincere cooperation. Additionally, Article 19 of the TEU 
requires Member States to provide sufficient remedies that guarantee 
effective legal protection in the fields covered by EU law.
From this point of view, the Italian Constitution (1948; art. 111 
was changed in 1999) has implemented all these principles in two 
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fundamental articles, one in part I (Rights and duties of citizens) 
and the other in Title IV (The judicial branch): the first one, that 
is, Article 24, grants the right to take action in court for everyone 
who needs to protect his right sunder civil and administrative law; 
it ensures the right of defense in every stage and instance of legal 
proceedings and provided that those who are ‘not wealthy enough’ 
could have proper means for action or defense before all courts27. 
The second one, Article 111, establishes the right to a fair trial and 
explains in details what this right means: ‘Jurisdiction shall be imple-
mented through due process regulated by law. All court trials shall be 
conducted with adversary proceedings and parties shall be entitled 
to equal conditions before a third-party and impartial judge. The law 
shall provide for a reasonable duration of trials. In criminal law trials, 
the law shall establish that the accused be promptly and confiden-
tially informed of the nature and reasons of the charges and be given 
adequate time and conditions to prepare a defense. A defendant shall 
have the right to cross-examine witnesses for the prosecution, or to 
have them cross-examined before a judge; examine witnesses for the 
defense in the same conditions as the prosecutor; and the right to 
produce any evidence for the defense. The defendant shall be en-
titled to the assistance of an interpreter in the case such defendant 
cannot speak or understand the language in which court proceedings 
are conducted. The formation of evidence in criminal law trials shall 
be based on an adversarial process. The guilt of the defendant may 
not be established on the basis of statements by persons who have 
willingly refused cross-examination by the defendant or the defen-
dant’s counsel. The law shall regulate the cases in which the for-
mation of evidence may not occur in an adversarial process, with 
the consent of the defendant or owing to verified objective impos-
sibility or proven illicit conduct. All judicial decisions shall include 
a statement of reasons. Appeals to the Court of Cassation in cases of 
violations of the law shall always be allowed against sentences and 
against measures affecting personal freedom pronounced by ordinary 
and special courts. This rule can only be waived in cases of sentences 
27 “Anyone may bring cases before a court of law in order to protect their rights under 
civil and administrative law. Defense is an inviolable right at every stage and instance of 
legal proceedings. The poor are entitled by law to proper means for action or defense in all 
courts. The law shall determine the conditions and forms regulating damages in case of judicial 
errors”.
“Tutti possono agire in giudizio per la tutela dei propri diritti e interessi legittimi. La difesa è 
diritto inviolabile in ogni stato e grado del procedimento. Sono assicurati ai non abbienti, con 
appositi istituti, i mezzi per agire e difendersi davanti ad ogni giurisdizione. La legge determina 
le condizioni e i modi per la riparazione degli errori giudiziari”.
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by military tribunals in time of war. Appeals to the Court of Cas-
sation against decisions of the Council of State and the Court of Ac-
counts are permitted only for reasons of jurisdiction’28.
Nevertheless, as observed recently, ‘Italy is a country where 
the conflict between law in books (particularly in the Fundamental 
Charter) and law in action is extremely acute29.
First of all, there was and there is not a real political debate 
around the subject of access to justice: no mentions of it in parlia-
mentary debates or in political party manifestos, with the only ex-
ception of the Five Star Movement (Movimento 5 Stelle)30, whose 
political agenda includes some minor reform proposals in the fields 
of legal costs, ADR systems, legal aid and class actions31.
The lack of political debate results in the fact that in the last 
twenty years the majority of legislative provisions related to access 
to justice were merely the implementation of European directives: 
for example, this is the case with the statute no. 89 of 2001 (the so-
28 “La giurisdizione si attua mediante il giusto processo regolato dalla legge. Ogni processo 
si svolge nel contraddittorio tra le parti, in condizioni di parità, davanti a giudice terzo e impar-
ziale. La legge ne assicura la ragionevole durata. 
Nel processo penale, la legge assicura che la persona accusata di un reato sia, nel più breve 
tempo possibile, informata riservatamente della natura e dei motivi dell’accusa elevata a suo 
carico; disponga del tempo e delle condizioni necessari per preparare la sua difesa; abbia la fa-
coltà, davanti al giudice, di interrogare o di far interrogare le persone che rendono dichiarazioni 
a suo carico, di ottenere la convocazione e l’interrogatorio di persone a sua difesa nelle stesse 
condizioni dell’accusa e l’acquisizione di ogni altro mezzo di prova a suo favore; sia assistita 
da un interprete se non comprende o non parla la lingua impiegata nel processo.
Il processo penale è regolato dal principio del contraddittorio nella formazione della prova. La 
colpevolezza dell’imputato non può essere provata sulla base di dichiarazioni rese da chi, per 
libera scelta, si è sempre volontariamente sottratto all’interrogatorio da parte dell’imputato o 
del suo difensore.
La legge regola i casi in cui la formazione della prova non ha luogo in contraddittorio per 
consenso dell’imputato o per accertata impossibilità di natura oggettiva o per effetto di provata 
condotta illecita.
Tutti i provvedimenti giurisdizionali devono essere motivati.
Contro le sentenze e contro i provvedimenti sulla libertà personale, pronunciati dagli organi 
giurisdizionali ordinari o speciali, è sempre ammesso ricorso in Cassazione per violazione di 
legge. Si può derogare a tale norma soltanto per le sentenze dei tribunali militari in tempo di 
guerra.
Contro le decisioni del Consiglio di Stato e della Corte dei conti il ricorso in Cassazione è 
ammesso per i soli motivi inerenti alla giurisdizione”.
29 “L’Italia è un Paese dove sono particolarmente acute le contraddizioni tra il diritto scritto 
nei libri, a cominciare dalla Carta fondamentale, e il diritto che vive nella società civile, non-
ché nei rapporti tra i cittadini e le diverse articolazioni del potere”; S. Chiarloni, ‘Riflessioni 





called Legge Pinto), that provided for a remedy to resort to in case 
of unreasonable length of judicial proceedings and was passed in re-
sponse to the many cases that in the previous years had been lodged 
against Italy with the European Court of Human Rights; it is also 
the case with the Legislative Decree n. 28/2010, that introduced in 
Italy civil mediation, following EU directive 2008/52/CE and with 
Legislative Decree n. 130/2015, that introduced ADR for consumers, 
following EU directive 2013/11/EU.
This kind of emergency legislation was also behind the refor-
mation of legal aid in 2001 and 2002 (consolidated law no. 115 of 
2002, on litigation costs, Articles 74190), because private lawyers, 
well represented in parliamentary chambers, wanted to prevent 
the possible introduction of a staff attorney model (see 5.1) and so 
decided to promote a reformation that could replace a liberal pro 
bono model with a direct judicare model.
The result of all this is that the regulatory framework is frag-
mented, unclear and deficient, because there are many other fields 
relevant in granting access to justice, that are not covered by any 
provisions: for example, in real life every legal need, whether it is 
a right to defend or a contract to be draft, due to the lack of legal 
alphabetization in the population requires the assistance of a lawyer. 
This implies a fee for the advice, which is not covered by the legal 
aid system32. Also, many kinds of ADR solutions, like mediation and 
assisted negotiation, when not provided as mandatory steps before 
accessing the courts33, are not covered by legal aid provisions; for 
people who cannot afford a lawyer, these limitations undermine the 
general purpose of ADR, that is to avoid a trial as a mean to resolve 
the dispute more quickly and without the expenses of a judicial 
proceeding. 
A public debate around access to justice problems does not really 
exist, and the scholarly debate is not so heated: if we except a general 
study of 2016 in which Alessandra Osti tried to evaluate the consti-
tutional and European problems of the access to justice in Italy, com-
paring to those of other countries34, very few other studies present a 
32 It is so despite the fact that the European Law grants also free legal consulting before the 
process has started. See 2003/8/Ce, art. 3: «Legal aid is considered to be appropriate when it 
guarantees: (a) pre-litigation advice with a view to reaching a settlement prior to bringing legal 
proceedings».
33 Because in compulsory cases there are judgements ruling that poor people have the right 
to receive legal aid from the State as in court; E. Ferraris, ‘ADR e patrocinio a spese dello 
Stato’, (2019) Il Giusto Processo Civile, 175-196.
34 A. Osti, Teoria e prassi dell’access to justice: un raffronto tra ordinamento nazionale e 
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detailed examinations of the general problems of granting access to 
justice35. Some do so from the point of view of European law36, while 
others compare the approach followed by different countries37, but 
in general they deal only with specific issue in the field of access to 
justice, such as legal aid38 or ADR39.
5. LEGAL AID SYSTEM
5.1. History oF LeGaL aid
The Italian State began his history officially as a Kingdom on 17 
March 1861, after a cultural and political process of constructing the 
national identity known as ‘Risorgimento. It aimed at overcoming 
the political fragmentation of the country into many regional States 
and to expel foreign powers out of the Peninsula, for instance the 
Austrian Empire, which ruled the Lombardo-Veneto. Therefore, this 
process developed through a series of war events, led by the Savoy 
dynasty (which until then had governed the regional Kingdom of 
Sardinia), or conducted somehow in agreement with it (for example, 
the famous expedition of the “Mille” led by Giuseppe Garibaldi). All 
these efforts finally brought about the creation of a new state entity 
in 1861, even though the goal of completing national unification was 
achieved only with the conquest of the Papal State in 1870 and with 
the annexation of Trento and Trieste in 1918.
The sudden formation of the new State required a considerable 
effort to harmonize the legislation in force in the pre-unification 
ordinamenti esteri, (Giuffrè 2016).
35 For example D. Dalfino, ‘Accesso alla giustizia, principio di effettività e adeguatezza 
della tutela giurisdizionale’, (2014) 3, Rivista trimestrale di diritto e procedura civile, 907; 
F. Carpi, ‘Note sull’accesso alla giustizia’, (2016) 3, Rivista trimestrale di diritto e procedura 
civile, 835.
36 N. Carboni, ‘From Quality to Access to Justice: Improving the Functioning of European 
Judicial Systems’, (2014) 3, Journal of Civil Legal Science, 131, https://www.omicsonline.org/
open-access/from-quality-to-access-to-justice-improving-the-functioning-of-european-judi-
cial-systems-2169-0170.1000131.php?aid=32150; D. Strazzari, ‘Access to Justice e stranieri: 
l’effettività della tutela nella prospettiva pluri-ordinamentale’, (2018) 3, Diritto Costituzionale. 
Rivista Quadrimestrale, 157.
37 U. Mattei, ‘Access to Justice. A Renewed Global Issue?’, (2007) 11.3, Electronic Journal 
of Comparative Law, https://www.ejcl.org/113/abs113-14.html .
38 I. Frioni, ‘Aspetti sostanziali del nuovo patrocinio dei non abbienti alla luce del D.P.R. 30 
maggio 2002, n. 115’, (2003) 2, Cassazione penale, 702.
39 For example G. Alpa, ‘Commissione di studio per l’elaborazione di una organica discipli-
na volta alla «degiurisdizionalizzazione»’, (2017) 2, Rivista trimestrale di diritto e procedura 
civile, 793; N. Trocker, ‘Accesso alla giustizia e «degiurisdizionalizzazione»: il tramonto del 
diritto al giudice e al giudizio?’, (2018) 3, Diritto Costituzionale. Rivista Quadrimestrale, 37. 
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States: for reasons of speed, the strategy was often limited to extend 
the Sardinian-Piedmont legislation to the other territories, with the 
modifications that were deemed necessary from time to time. At first, 
this led to apply to the entire national territory the judiciary existing 
in the Kingdom of Sardinia, which also included some offices as-
signed to the defense of the poor according to a mixed model known 
as the Advocacy for the Poor (Avvocatura dei poveri).
The statute on the judiciary drawn up in 1859, in fact, provided 
every Court of Appeal with an office of the Advocacy of the Poor, 
composed of lawyers and prosecutors paid by the State and included 
in the career of the judiciary (of which they represented the first step). 
The office offered advice and procedural defense activities for free to 
the poor, in both civil and criminal matters; it also provided a lawyer 
for any accused person who had appointed one of its choice. In all 
inferior courts, however, these activities were attributed by the judge 
to one member of the local Bar Association, who performed his tasks 
free of charge (pro bono).
The admission to the ‘benefit’, as it was called, required the pre-
sentation of a poverty certificate issued by the mayor of the city of 
residence and, in civil cases only, the demonstration of the probable 
substantiation of the claims that the plaintiff wanted to take to court 
(fumus boni iuris); it included the exemption from litigation costs, 
which were possibly recovered from the losing party at the end of 
the trial.
This model had its roots in the paternalism of medieval Sa-
baudian rulers, who believed that this way they would fulfill their 
task as guardians of the weak and the marginalized subjects of their 
crown. It was an exception, compared to the legal systems of the 
other pre-unification States, which in large majority confined them-
selves to entrust the defense of the poor to private lawyers, who were 
supposed to perform their duties pro bono.
The effort for national unification in terms of war expenditures, 
as well as the union of the public debts of the pre-unification states 
and the difficulties in standardizing and rationalizing the tax levy on 
the whole territory led to a financial emergency that filled the par-
liamentary debates at least until 1867 and that was addressed with a 
policy of abrupt intervention on public spending. 
Therefore, in this context it is not surprising that some of the 
criticisms already made to the Advocacy of the poor, mainly linked 
to the impossibility of the defender’s autonomous choice and to the 
suspicion that a public defense magistrate was too conniving with the 
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equally prosecutor’s public magistrate, converged with the budgetary 
requirements in causing the  abolition of the public office for the 
defense of the poor, in favor of a complete pro bono regime. 
The Royal Decree-Law n. 2627 of 1865 established the ‘honorary 
and obligatory’ responsibility to grant the defense of poor people and 
entrusted it with private lawyers pro bono. The same statutory in-
strument set up a Commission for legal aid, composed of judges and 
lawyers, with a view to evaluating the right of any applicants to take 
legal action free of charge. As in the past, applicants were required 
to demonstrate both their inability to sustain the costs of litigation 
and, in civil matter, also the probable substantiation of their claims. 
A positive evaluation by the Commission granted the anticipation of 
the costs of litigation by the tax authorities; these costs would be paid 
by the losing party or, in the alternative, by the poor if he had won 
the case, obtaining from the judgment an amount of money sufficient 
to cover the costs. However, the poor could bear the responsibility of 
reimbursing the costs if he lost the case and his financial conditions 
improved in the future.
The other irony was that the litigants could not even choose a 
lawyer on their own, because in civil cases the lawyer would be 
assigned by the Commission, while in criminal cases he would be 
chosen by the judge in charge of the case: in any event, the lawyer 
would be selected from a list formed by the Bar Association.
This new way to provide legal aid to the poorest people rose an 
intense criticism: in fact, the reality was that Bar Associations ex-
cluded many leading lawyers from the list, so that they could avoid 
pro bono cases, and therefore only the youngers and less skilled 
lawyers were generally chosen. On the other hand, it was said that to 
compel a private lawyer to defend someone free of charge would un-
dermine his commitment and would reduce the time he was inclined 
to spend for the defense, if compared to the time that he devoted 
to paying clients, thus reducing the general quality of his work and 
jeopardizing the success of the case.
In spite of all this criticism, the worries of the Government about 
budgetary needs pressed the Parliament to pass a statute that could 
further reduce the costs of the legal expenses that the State had to 
anticipate, de facto decreasing the number of individuals who could 
take advantage of the “privilege”. As a matter of fact, in 1880 a statute 
was passed (statute no. 5526, all. D) that required to the applicant a 
demonstration of his inability to face litigation costs based on the 
property tax he paid every year; the tax officer was also compelled 
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to send to the Legal Aid Commission an opinion about the poverty 
status of every applicant. The hope nurtured by the Government was 
to restrict the ‘privilege’ only to those who really needed it, but in 
fact the result was that only those who owned literally nothing could 
apply, while many other individuals who were not rich enough to pay 
the litigation costs were excluded.
Despite the fact that in the subsequent years there were many 
attempts at modifying this system (for example, by reintroducing 
the Advocacy of the poor or by entrusting the legal aid to the juris-
diction of the town councils)40, nothing was really changed and the 
new statute that was passed in 1923 (no. 3282) was just an updating 
of the previous ones. 
After the World War II, the claim for a reform in the legal aid 
model, so as to grant a more equal access to justice to those in 
need and also to provide for a reasonable reward of the lawyers in-
volved, was taken into consideration by the Constitutional Assembly. 
However, nothing happened due to the unresolved conflict between 
the proposal to reintroduce some kind of public institution fully 
entrusted with the task of legal aid, and the other proposal, which 
simply wanted to bind the State to pay for those in need not only the 
litigation costs, but also the legal defense by a private lawyer.
The result was the sec. 3 of Article 24 of the Italian Constitution, 
which tried to combine the different approaches, but does not state 
anything clear about the way to provide this new form of legal aid: 
‘The poor (non abbienti) are entitled by law to proper means for 
action or defense in all courts’41. The debate in the Constitutional 
Assembly reached only one objective that is impossible to notice in 
the official English translation: it overcame the idea that the legal 
aid system was addressed only to poor people who had not enough 
income to pay litigation costs, and instead it widened its application 
to everyone who had an income lower than a standard threshold es-
tablished by the State; this was done by replacing the word “poor” 
40 In the first decade of the XX century, the emersion of the industrial proletariat in many 
cities of the country gave rise to a new attention to the problems of social justice, problems 
that could not be answered only by the Church assistance programs and therefore became a 
central political task for the Socialist party, founded in 1892. In fact, there were many attempts 
at introducing some reforms in the legal aid model by socialist deputies or by representative 
of the Historical Left or the liberal wing of the Parliament, often also linked to each other by 
masonic belonging: for example, the deputy Carlo Gallini, or the ministers of Justice Francesco 
Cocco-Ortu, Nicolò Gallo, Vittorio Emanuele Orlando and Carlo Finocchiaro Aprile. None of 
these reform projects was finally approved.
41 “Sono assicurati ai non abbienti, con appositi istituti, i mezzi per agire e difendersi davan-
ti ad ogni giurisdizione”.
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(povero) with an expression that could perhaps be translated as “not 
wealthy enough” (non abbiente).
After that, the focus on legal aid system was renewed only at the 
end of the Sixties, in the Protests of 1968 context that gave new life 
to social equality claims and was accepted by many legal scholars 
of the time42, like Giuseppe Marafioti, Vittorio Denti, Mauro Cap-
pelletti and Nicola Trocker, who tried to find a new possible way of 
granting access to court with a comparative legal approach; more so, 
they began to understand the problem of legal aid in a broader sense, 
not limited to an individual court case, but extended to a variety of 
interests, all linked under the denomination ‘Access to Justice”’43.
The critics against the Italian pro bono model were essentially 
focused on the fact that poor people did not have any possibilities to 
find free legal advice before going to court, because the law covered 
only the assistance and the litigation costs, but only after the applicant 
had been admitted to legal aid by the Commission; therefore, he had 
to hire and pay a lawyer in order to apply to the Commission, and in 
his application he had to prove the fumus boni iuris. This was also 
likely to undermine his defense, because his legal arguments would 
be known to his opponent long before the judgement.
Many of these remarks formed the basis for a reformation bill 
submitted to parliamentary discussion in 1968 and again in 1972, 
and advancing several changes to the past model: for example, it 
changed the requirements to be met, providing that the applicant was 
expected to demonstrate only that his annual income was under the 
legal threshold and that his legal claims were not groundless. The bill 
also provided that the applicant could at last choose his lawyer, who 
would be paid by the State, exactly like any other experts that could 
take part in the proceedings. 
However, despite the relevance of the changes and the common 
opinion of legal scholars, lawyers and judges that the legal aid system 
did not work at all, the bill was rejected due to financial reasons. In 
42 In the paper “The Justice of the Poor” (‘La giustizia dei poveri’, (1968) 91, Foro italiano 
113-114; 119-120), one of the firsts on our topic, published in 1968 in the political review 
L’Astrolabio and then in the Foro italiano, Mauro Cappelletti referred to his discussion with 
Florentine students at the University in 1967-1968 and to the School of Barbiana run by don 
Milani, one experiment of a new form of educating children that went against the official 
educational programs of the time and was inspired also by the socialistic battle for equality in 
education and justice.
43 This was particularly the case of the Florence Access to Justice Project, funded by the 
Ford Fundation and directed by Mauro Cappelletti and Bryan Garth, which took place in 1978 
and 1979. 
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spite of that, a positive step was taken in 1973, when a new legal 
aid scheme was established for labor cases (statute no 533 of 1973), 
even though the person was not allowed to choose his own lawyer, 
who was appointed by the court in charge of the case. Later, the same 
scheme was extended to adoption cases (statute no. 184 of 1983, art. 
75) and to cases brought against judges claiming damages for ju-
dicial misconduct (statute no. 117 of 1988, art. 15).
In any event, the legal aid system as provided for by the Decree 
of 1923 was collapsing, because it did not meet the new requirements 
laid down by civil and criminal procedure (as clarified by the Con-
stitutional Court in 1983 and in 1992. In fact, it was clear that, par-
ticularly in criminal cases in which the representation in court by a 
lawyer was mandatory, the absence of any financial compensation 
doe the lawyer made the system totally ineffective. This was also 
voiced in a judgement issued by the European Court of Human Rights 
(Artico vs. Italy, 6694/74, 13th may 1980): “The Government […] 
regarded the obligation as satisfied by the nomination of a lawyer 
for legal aid purposes, contending that what occurred thereafter was 
in no way the concern of the Italian Republic. […] The Court recalls 
that the Convention is intended to guarantee not rights that are theo-
retical or illusory but rights that are practical and effective; this is 
particularly so of the rights of the defense in view of the prominent 
place held in a democratic society by the right to a fair trial, from 
which they derive”.
This judgment forced the Parliament to pass a reform of legal 
aid, but that was limited only to criminal proceedings, because many 
believed that for civil cases a new legal aid was not necessary: as 
a matter of fact, poor people did not go to court unless they were 
certain that they could win the case, provided that their case was 
against a wealthy opponent, who could pay the legal expenses if he 
lost the case.
The new statute no. 217, enacted the 30th July 1990, solved a few 
problems that had arisen under the previous regulation: it widened 
the list of people who could benefit from it, including not only the 
defendant, but also the aggrieved party and the plaintiff claiming 
damages. It widened the range of professionals who could be paid by 
the State for their advice in judicial proceedings: not only the lawyer, 
chosen by the “not enough wealthy” defendant within a list formed 
by the local Bar Association, but also experts, witnesses and any 
other persons taking part in the proceeding. They would receive com-
pensation, paid in advance by the State (even though at a minimum 
level); the preliminary request for the admission submitted to the 
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judge of the trial was covered, too. In short, the statute introduced a 
judicare system in Italian criminal legal aid.
It was better than in the past, but not a real revolution: partic-
ularly, the fact that lawyers will be paid at a minimum level and often 
after a long delay of time did not really grant a more efficient defense 
to their clients. The result was that only the younger and less expe-
rienced lawyers wanted to inserted in the list for legal aid, like in the 
past. Again, the access system was too cumbersome and discouraging 
for both poor people and individuals with low income, too. Finally, it 
created an unreasonable difference between criminal cases and civil 
ones that appeared to be a violation of the constitutional right to an 
equal treatment.
Legal scholars criticized this new missed opportunity to change 
radically the model of legal aid: some proposed to create a hybrid 
system, that could mix judicare with a staff attorney model (that is 
a state organism for direct provision of legal services). This propo-
sition was taken into account later, in 1997, during the debate in the 
Bicameral Commission for the revision of the Constitution. It was in 
fact suggested a change in art. 24, sec. 3, so as to provides that ‘The 
law establishes public offices in charge of legal aid in order to grant 
an effective defense at every stage of judicial procedures to those 
devoid of adequate means”44. 
For political reasons the Commission failed and no revisions 
whatsoever were approved, but for the opponents of a staff attorney 
model of legal aid (essentially, private lawyers who were fighting 
every attempt at creating a public attorney figure) it was enough to 
advance a different proposal. 
In 1998 they submitted a bill to modify the statute of 1990, but 
again only in criminal trials. It was only during the parliamentary 
debate that it was suggested to extend the judicare system to civil 
and administrative cases as well, which was done by statute no. 134 
of 2001. The statute simplified the access to legal aid, increased the 
income level and solved a few other procedural issues; above all, it 
finally repealed the 1923 statute and the mandatory pro bono model 
in favor of a general judicare system in any types of judicial process.
The following year the entire legislation on legal aid was recast 
in a consolidated text that regulated the whole field of legal costs 
(T.U. no. 115 of 2002) and it is still the law in force.
44 “La legge istituisce uffici pubblici di assistenza legale per rendere effettivo l’esercizio del 
diritto di difesa, in ogni fase del procedimento, anche da parte di chi non ha mezzi adeguati”.
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In conclusion, the history of legal aid in Italy is just the result of 
emergency measures adopted any time the legislator was compelled 
to take action by international court decisions or by internal political 
risks, and not the outcome of a sensible reform; again, it is still de-
ficient in responding to the legal needs of the poor when they arise 
out of court: for example, any kinds of legal advice, like preventive 
advocacy, assistance in writing contracts and legal documents, and 
defense in out of court procedures.
5.2. LeGisLative Framework For LeGaL aid
The applicable law on the subject of legal aid in Italy is the con-
solidated law n. 115/2002 (D.P.R. 30 maggio 2002, n. 115), which 
regulates the matter of legal costs in general and, in its articles from 
74 to 190, the legal aid system in criminal, civil and administrative 
proceedings.
In criminal matters, the recipient of the benefice could be every 
person (citizen, foreigner or stateless person who is resident in the 
country45) insofar he is indicted, defendant, convicted, victim of a 
crime or the plaintiff claiming damages, provided that the annual 
family income46 is lower than €11,493.82  (in 2019: the exact amount 
is updated every year by a decree issued by the Ministry of Justice47). 
For victims of sexual crimes, especially if against children, the 
income limit does not apply48. 
In civil and administrative cases, the recipient can be every 
person (citizen; stranger and stateless, both if legally residing in the 
country) and also non-profit organizations49 whose annual income is 
under the above-mentioned limit, if they can prove that their claims 
45 “Il trattamento previsto per il cittadino italiano è assicurato altresì allo straniero e all’apo-
lide residente nello
Stato”; art. 90.
46 “Salvo quanto previsto dall’articolo 92, se l’interessato convive con il coniuge o con 
altri familiari, il reddito è costituito dalla somma dei redditi conseguiti nel medesimo periodo 
da ogni componente della famiglia, compreso l’istante”; art. 76 comma 2. However, the limit 
is increased for each member of the family of 1032, 91 €: “Se l’interessato all’ammissione 
al patrocinio convive con il coniuge o con altri familiari, si applicano le disposizioni di cui 
all’articolo 76, comma 2, ma i limiti di reddito indicati dall’articolo 76, comma 1, sono elevati 
di euro 1.032,91 per ognuno dei familiari conviventi”; art. 92.
47 D.M. 16 gennaio 2018 in G.U. n. 49 del 28 febbraio 2018.
48 See art. 76, § 4 bis, 4 ter and 4 quater.
49 “Il trattamento previsto per il cittadino italiano è assicurato, altresì, allo straniero rego-
larmente soggiornante sul territorio nazionale al momento del sorgere del rapporto o del fatto 
oggetto del processo da instaurare e all’apolide, nonché ad enti o associazioni che non perse-
guono scopi di lucro e non esercitano attività economica”; art. 119.
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are not groundless50.
The petition in criminal cases must be addressed to the judge in 
charge of the trial51, while in civil processes to the Bar Association 
of the district in which the court having jurisdiction over the case is 
located; in administrative cases, the petition must be lodged with a 
mixed Commission composed by lawyers and judges of the courts. 
The authority decides within ten days and is supposed to send the 
petition also to the tax officer for a check52.
Once granted, legal aid will be in operation in any stage of the 
process, without the need of submitting a new petition.
As a result of the granting of legal aid, a “not wealthy enough” 
person could choose his own lawyer in a list kept by every Bar As-
sociation; a few judicial fees are advanced by the State (for example, 
taxes, travel expenses and fees for advisors, appraisers, judges, 
bailiffs, witnesses and lawyers), while other activities are free of 
charge (for instance, copies of judicial documents)53. The fees ad-
vanced by the State can be recovered from the losing party or from 
the same party to whom the legal aid was granted, if the privilege is 
later withdrawn54 or if the person is able to earn at least six times the 
amount advanced by the State55.
50 “È assicurato il patrocinio nel processo penale per la difesa del cittadino non abbiente, 
indagato, imputato, condannato, persona offesa da reato, danneggiato che intenda costituirsi 
parte civile, responsabile civile ovvero civilmente obbligato per la pena pecuniaria. È, altresì, 
assicurato il patrocinio nel processo civile, amministrativo, contabile, tributario e negli affari di 
volontaria giurisdizione, per la difesa del cittadino non abbiente quando le sue ragioni risultino 
non manifestamente infondate”.
51 “L’istanza è presentata esclusivamente dall’interessato o dal difensore, ovvero inviata, a 
mezzo raccomandata, all’ufficio del magistrato innanzi al quale pende il processo. Se procede 
la Corte di cassazione, l’istanza è presentata all’ufficio del magistrato che ha emesso il provve-
dimento impugnato”; art. 93 § 1.
52 “Copia dell’istanza dell’interessato, delle dichiarazioni e della documentazione allegate, 
nonché del decreto di ammissione al patrocinio sono trasmesse, a cura dell’ufficio del magi-
strato che procede, all’ufficio finanziario nell’ambito della cui competenza territoriale è situato 
l’ufficio del predetto magistrato.
L’ufficio finanziario verifica l’esattezza dell’ammontare del reddito attestato dall’interessato, 
nonché la compatibilità dei dati indicati con le risultanze dell’anagrafe tributaria, e può dispor-
re che sia effettuata, anche avvalendosi della collaborazione della Guardia di finanza, la verifica 
della posizione fiscale dell’istante e degli altri soggetti indicati nell’articolo 76.
Se risulta che il beneficio è stato erroneamente concesso, l’ufficio finanziario richiede il prov-
vedimento di revoca, ai sensi dell’articolo 112”; art. 98. For civil and administrative processes 
see art. 127.
53 See articles 107, 108, 131 and 132.
54 See articles 112, 113, 114 and 136.
55 Art. 133: “Il provvedimento che pone a carico della parte soccombente non ammessa 
al patrocinio la rifusione delle spese processuali a favore della parte ammessa dispone che il 
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5.3. institutionaL Framework For LeGaL aid
As mentioned above, legal aid in Italy is organized as a direct 
judicare model, according to which the legal activity performed by 
lawyers is paid with public funds on a case-by-case basis. The fact 
that there is always an individual relation between a single lawyer 
and a single client implies that an organized client community that 
could be involved in setting priority for legal aid or in participating 
in governance does not exist.
The system is implemented thanks to a cooperation between the 
State and local Bar Associations. There is a Bar Association in every 
court district throughout the country; there is also a National Bar 
Association in Rome, that coordinate the activities of local Bar As-
sociations and represents interests of lawyers vis-a-vis the Ministry 
of Justice.
Every district Bar Association is responsible for keeping an 
updated list of the lawyers available to provide legal aid to those in 
need. The Bar Association is also in charge of exercising control over 
the respect of professional standards by all lawyers. 
It is impossible to know exactly the national number of lawyers 
in the lists for legal aid; it goes from 4.901 for the district in which 
Milan sits with its 3,256,000 permanent residents, to 524 for the 
district in which a small southern town like Vibo Valentia (with 
only 162,516 permanent residents) sits; however it is certain that the 
lawyers listed for legal aid cover more or less the whole country, 
even small villages.
5.4. LeGaL aid budGet
The legal aid funding is fully provided by the government in the 
annual budget for justice as a part of an item called ‘justice expenses’ 
(spese di giustizia), which however includes many other expenses, 
such as travel expenses of judges, witnesses, police officers; the 
service of procedural documents; the extradition of criminals, and 
so on.
pagamento sia eseguito a favore dello Stato”.
Art. 134, § 1 and 2: “Se lo Stato non recupera ai sensi dell’articolo 133 e se la vittoria della 
causa o la composizione della lite ha messo la parte ammessa al patrocinio in condizione di po-
ter restituire le spese erogate in suo favore, su di questa lo Stato ha diritto di rivalsa. La rivalsa 
può essere esercitata per le spese prenotate e anticipate quando per sentenza o transazione la 
parte ammessa ha conseguito almeno il sestuplo delle spese, o nel caso di rinuncia all’azione o 
di estinzione del giudizio, può essere esercitata per le sole spese anticipate indipendentemente 
dalla somma o valore conseguito”.
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The legal aid budget is increased every year, because of the 
annual revision of the income threshold applicants must respect. 
The level of national budget for legal aid from 2010 to 2017 is 
described in the graphic below56:
Chart 06. Legal aid budget in millions of euros 
5.5. LeGaL aid providers
To be added to the list for legal aid kept by the district Bar As-
sociation, a lawyer must have been practicing for at least two years; 
he should not have been the subject of any disciplinary actions and 
is supposed to demonstrate aptitude and experience57; every local 
56 Data extracted from the annual report on justice expenses to the Parliament since 2010: 
http://documenti.camera.it/_dati/leg18/lavori/documentiparlamentari/IndiceETesti/095/001_
RS/INTERO_COM.pdf; http://documenti.camera.it/_dati/leg17/lavori/documentiparlamenta-
ri/IndiceETesti/095/001/INTERO.pdf; for the years 2018 and 2019 data are not yet available.
57 “L’elenco degli avvocati per il patrocinio a spese dello Stato è formato dagli avvocati che 
ne fanno domanda e che siano in possesso dei requisiti previsti dal comma 2. L’inserimento 
nell’elenco è deliberato dal consiglio dell’ordine, il quale valuta la sussistenza dei seguenti 
requisiti e condizioni:
a) attitudini ed esperienza professionale specifica, distinguendo tra processi civili, penali, am-
ministrativi, contabili, tributari ed affari di volontaria giurisdizione;
b) assenza di sanzioni disciplinari superiori all’avvertimento irrogate nei cinque anni prece-
denti la domanda;
c) iscrizione all’Albo degli avvocati da almeno due anni.




Bar Association decides how to interpret these conditions in a more 
or less strict sense. These requirements were established in order to 
assure a minimum of experience and skills in the legal defense, so as 
not to leave poor people in the hands of the youngest and less expe-
rienced lawyers.
When a lawyer wants to be added to the list, he must fill out an 
application form, specifying if he prefers to plead in civil, adminis-
trative or criminal cases, and stating that he meets the requirements 
laid down by the law. The district Bar Association verifies only that 
the requirements are met, but it can exclude a lawyer from the list if 
he has received disciplinary sanctions.
Lawyers are paid in force of a payment order issued by the judge 
of the case, according to the provisions of ministerial decree no. 
55 of 2014; this regulatory measure gives some broad indications 
depending on the type of assistance provided by the lawyer, on the 
value of the case, on the kind of procedure adopted and other factors. 
Normally, standard fees are reduced by 1/3 for criminal cases58 and 
by 1/2 for civil and administrative cases59 which means that lawyers, 
when providing legal aid, earn much less than what they could make 
if they represented paying clients60. 
Other problems were related to the fact that the average payment 
time by the State was around two or three years from the conclusion 
of the judicial proceeding61. This downgraded the work carried on by 
lawyers, because it placed upon them a burden that they had to bear 
only because they decided to assist the ones in need. Fortunately, in 
2016 a new rule was adopted so that the judge in charge of the case 
is now required to issue an order for payment when he closes the 
proceeding: the result is that the time that elapses before the payment 
is made is reduced to one or two years.
Another attempt to solve this problem was introduced by the 
budget law of 2016 (l. 28th December 2015, no. 208), which provided 
that any credit a lawyer has toward the State can be offset with any 
L’elenco è rinnovato entro il 31 gennaio di ogni anno, è pubblico, e si trova presso tutti gli uffici 
giudiziari situati nel territorio di ciascuna provincia”; D.P.R. 30 maggio 2002, n. 115, art. 81.
58 Art. 106 bis D.P.R. 30 maggio 2002.
59 Art. 130 D.P.R. 30 maggio 2002.
60 The National Bar Association (Consiglio nazionale forense) had set up standard 
protocols to calculate lawyers’ fees in more or less any kind of procedures; see https://www.
consiglionazionaleforense.it/web/cnf/protocolli-sui-compensi. 




tax or fee the lawyer must pay to the State. 
However, all these measures do not always work, due to the 
ambiguity of the law that allows judicial offices to adopt different 
practices in validating lawyers’ fees. For this reason, in 201862 the 
National Bar Association (Consiglio Nazionale Forense) submitted 
a proposal to the Minister of Justice, as of now the proposal has not 
become a bill pending before the Parliament.
5.6. QuaLity assurance
In the Italian judicare system, lawyers who provide legal aid are 
subject to the professional code of conduct and to the disciplinary 
power of the Bar Association like any other lawyers 63. There are no 
specific mechanisms designed to monitor the quality of the work per-
formed by the lawyers providing legal aid.
5.7. criminaL LeGaL aid
5.7.1. Scope of criminal legal aid
The principle of legal aid was introduced in the Italian Consti-
tution (art. 24 sec. 3) since 1948, but its effective enforcement in the 
Italian criminal procedure has required substantial time and efforts64, 
and it is still to be completed65. The limit of the legal aid principles af-
firmed in the Constitution (as well as in the supranational legislation, 
like  art. 6 of the European Convention of Human Rights (hereinafter 
referred to as the EHCR); art. 14 of the International covenant on 
civil and political rights (hereinafter referred to as the ICCP); art. 47 
of the Charter of fundamental rights of the European Union) derives 
from the difficulty of implementing it in practice without dealing with 
the economic challenges posed by it.
Only after the entering into force of the new code of criminal 
procedure, the implementation of legal aid has been attempted in 
practice. After several amendments, legal aid is now governed by 
d.p.r. of 25 May 2002, no. 115 (hereinafter referred to as the TU), 
applicable to all legal proceedings, which contains a few provisions 
62 See the previous footnote.
63 See the code of conduct here: https://www.consiglionazionaleforense.it/
documents/20182/451926/CODICE+DEONTOLOGICO+FORENSE++-+annotato+con+lo+s
pecchietto+delle+sanzioni.pdf/da35b877-379c-4a4d-856c-4403750ae9dc 
64 M. Chiavario, Processo e garanzie della persona, (Giuffrè 1984), 371 ss.
65 G. Bellucci, Il patrocinio a spese dello Stato, (Giappichelli 2019); nonché L. Dipaola, 
Difesa d’ufficio e patrocinio dei non abbienti nel processo penale, (Giuffrè 2016).
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(artt. 90-118 TU) specifically referring to criminal proceedings.
Subsequently, European Directive 2016/1919/UE, on legal aid 
paid by the State for suspects and accused persons in criminal pro-
ceedings and persons who are researched in furtherance of European 
arrest mandates, introduced minimum provisions on: 1). the right to 
defense for individuals who are under arrest or which are needy in-
dividuals; 2). the need that such right be widely and promptly rec-
ognized; 3). the quality of the assistance and the adequate formation 
of all participants to the administration of justice66. The Directive was 
implemented by d. lgs. 7 March 2019, no. 24. Only minor changes 
to the existing provisions on legal aid were needed to implement the 
Directive in Italy, as the Italian system was already compliant, at 
least on paper67.
Among different models, the Italian system provides for the right 
of the person entitled to legal aid to choose a defense lawyer, the 
cost of whom would be liquidated by the judicial authority and paid 
by the State. Legal aid has a wide application both as far as the en-
titled subjects are concerned and the type of procedural activities. 
In particular, art. 98 of the Code lists among the potential recipients 
of legal aid the accused, the victim of the offence, and the person 
responsible for the damages (in reality, pursuant to art. 74 TU, the 
list includes the suspect, the convicted person and the person which 
is jointly liable for the fine). Witnesses are not entitled to legal aid, 
on the contrary. 
Legal aid rights are granted to all Italian citizens as well as to 
(i) foreigners regularly residing in Italy (albeit with a temporary 
permit)68 and to stateless persons residing in Italy (art. 90 TU); (ii) 
non-profit entities and associations that do not carry out economic 
activities (art. 119 TU).
According to the Parliament’s Report on the application of the 
66 L. Camaldo, ‘La direttiva 2016/1919/UE sul gratuito patrocinio completa il quadro eu-
ropeo delle garanzie difensive nei procedimenti penali’, www.penalecontemporaneo.it, 13 di-
cembre 2016; C. Peloso, ‘L’approvazione della direttiva 2016/1919 sul patrocinio a spese dello 
Stato: la battuta finale nel cammino verso la mappatura dei diritti procedurali fondamentali’, 
www.legislazione penale.eu, 4 maggio 2017.
67 For some critical comments, v. F. Dri, ‘Vizi e virtù dell’attuazione della direttiva 
2016/1919/UE sul patrocinio a spese dello Stato: una prima lettura’, http://www.processope-
naleegiustizia.it (2019) 5; E. Grisonich, ‘L’attuazione della direttiva 2016/1919/UE: un timido 
intervento di patrocinio a spese dello Stato’, www.penalecontemporaneo.it, 2016 (5), 213-230.
68 The number of foreigners interested in the benefit, in absolute terms, was always 
increasing in the period examined (only 3,335 foreigners in 1995, increased to 44,527 in 
2018; in percentage terms, however, the access of foreigners remained proportionate to that of 
citizens.
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TU69, about 90 per cent of the legal aid recipients fall within the cat-
egories of suspect, accused or convicted persons, while the number 
of victims is increasing. In general, the data relating to the period 
under review (1995-2018) show that legal aid applications have 
been increasing from 16,585 (1995) to 199,176 (2018), out of which 
171,314 applications were granted. 
Pursuant to art. 75 TU legal aid is granted in all phases of the 
proceeding. Although not expressly stated, procedures before inter-
national courts are included, too70.  In addition, a new par. 2 bis ex-
tended legal aid to European arrest mandate procedures, in which 
Italy is an active or passive party. 
Legal aid is applicable essentially to all offences. There are some 
limitations with respect to certain crimes for which there are legal 
presumptions of legal aid exclusion for lack of personal prerequisites 
(infra, 5.7.2.).
5.7.2 Eligibility criteria for criminal legal aid
While in civil and other proceedings legal aid is not available 
when the action manifestly lacks sufficient legal grounds (art. 4 TU), 
in criminal proceedings the only condition is that the applicant is a 
low-income person. Art. 76 par. 2 TU sets a general personal income 
threshold of €11,528.41, to be assessed based on the last tax return. 
Such threshold applies to all jurisdictions and is subject to a biennial 
review. Limited to criminal proceedings, the threshold is increased 
by €1,032. 91 for each family member. 
Although the income threshold has been increased over the years, 
the current threshold is still too low, excluding from legal aid those 
individuals who are not in poverty, but are clearly lacking the nec-
essary resources to properly defend themselves. In order to address 
this problem, it has been observed that new rules should be devised 
in line with the aforementioned EU Directive 2016/1919/UE. 
Paragraph no. 8 of the whereas clauses of such directive states that 
«in granting legal aid paid by the State, the competent authorities of 
the Member States should be able to request the suspect, the accused 
or the person under search warrant to bear some of such costs  in pro-
portion to their financial assets». It would therefore be appropriate 
69 Relazione al Parlamento sull’applicazione del D.P.R. 115/02 “Testo unico delle dispo-
sizioni legislative e regolamentari in materia di spese di giustizia” (Analisi relativa agli anni 
1995-2018), in www. giustizia.it
70 F. Della Casa, ‘Soggetti’, in Bargis (eds.), Compendio di procedura penale, (Cedam 
2018), 147 ss.
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for the Italian system to do so.
In order to avoid abuses, the law provides the following: (i) 
the procedure which the legal aid applicant must follow in order to 
provide evidence of her income, (ii) the power of the judge to check 
the correctness of such evidence before granting legal aid, and (iii) 
subsequent review of the legal aid admission order (art. 98 TU).  A 
presumption that legal aid cannot be granted for lack of the applicable 
income conditions, applies to individuals who were convicted with 
final decision for certain crimes (criminal association mafia-related 
and all related common crimes, criminal association related to drug 
trafficking or to smuggling of foreign tobacco products, legal aid 
related crimes, income tax and VAT evasion).  The presumption can 
be overcome by the applicant who provides adequate evidence to the 
contrary. Differently, legal aid is granted without any conditions to 
victims of a number of family or sexual-related offences: the judge is 
required to grant legal aid, if requested, since the law intends to grant 
the victims of those offences an easier access to justice through legal 
aid.  In consideration of the social awareness surrounding this kind 
of offences, the same treatment has been recently extended (art. 1 
par. law 11 January 2018, no. 4) to minors and to individuals over 18 
who are not economically independent and are orphans following a 
homicide committed by the spouse or the unmarried partner, whether 
legally recognized or living together based on a stable relationship, 
without regard to the possibility that the relationship at the time of 
the crime was legally or factually terminated. That aside, in general 
specific provisions apply to minors: those who have not appointed 
a defense lawyer are entitled to legal aid ex officio, and the State 
will recover the relevant costs ex post in the event that the income 
thresholds were not met.  
5.7.3. Process for obtaining criminal legal aid
The person under investigation must be informed about her right 
to legal aid any time a defense attorney must be appointed ex officio 
(art. 103 TU e 369 bis CPP), i.e. before any act that must be done in 
the presence of the defense attorney.   
In the same communication the person under investigation is in-
formed that: a) in Italian proceedings the legal defense cannot be 
waived; b) the person under investigation can appoint a defense 
lawyer and that, absent such appointment, a defense lawyer will be 
appointed ex officio; c) the lawyer appointed ex officio  is entitled to 
seek compensation from the person under investigation in the event 
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the conditions for obtaining the benefit of legal aid paid by the State 
are absent, benefit which shall be also mentioned in the communi-
cation. Also, the victim of the offense, at the time of the acquisition of 
the information regarding the crime, must be informed by the public 
prosecutor and the judicial police of the right to appoint a defense 
lawyer and the possibility to obtain legal aid paid by the State (art. 
101 CPP). 
Regarding the procedure for the granting of legal aid, the appli-
cation (art. 93 TU), signed by the applicant and authenticated by her 
attorney, is filed with the proceeding judge; pursuant to case-law, the 
application may also be made orally, as long as it is regularly docu-
mented in the proceeding minutes. Once it has been filed, it is valid 
for all phases of the proceeding, including incidental and collateral 
procedures.  It is not valid for the enforcement phase, for the revision 
proceeding, for any proceeding before the judge or the monitoring 
court, for the application of security or prevention measures. 
The application is filed with the judge before which the pro-
ceeding is pending (art. 93 TU) and is decided upon by the same 
judge; in the preliminary phase, absent a clear legal provision, the 
case law has indicated that the preliminary investigations judge, 
being impartial, shall be competent to receive the application rather 
than the public prosecutor.  If the application is made while the pro-
ceeding is pending before the Court of Cassation, the application 
shall be filed before the judge who issued the decision which is being 
challenged.
The decision upon the application is taken within ten days.  Ac-
cording to the case law, the breach of such term results in a mere 
irregularity when the applicant was not actually prevented from ex-
ercising her defense rights.
After examining the conditions for the granting of legal aid, the 
judge – without specific formalities - may declare the application 
inadmissible, reject or approve it, with a decree filed or read at the 
hearing; the application is rejected if there are reasons to believe that 
the applicant does not meet the requirements of art. 76 e 92 TU, in the 
light of judicial records, life style, personal and family conditions, 
and business activities. 
The decree is subject to verification after its issuance and can 
be revoked at any time, if the underlying conditions result to be dif-
ferent.  If the decree rejects the application, it may be challenged by 
the applicant and -according to case-law- also by the applicant’s at-
torney with a motion to the Court or to the Appeals Court to which 
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the first judge belongs. The decision can be challenged with a motion 
to the Court of Cassation solely on legal grounds.  The challenge 
does not suspend the decision.
Art. 107 TU differentiates between free-of-charge disbursements 
(e.g. copy of proceeding documents, which are necessary for the 
defense) and costs that the State anticipates, which can be recovered 
from the applicant in case legal aid is revoked (art. 111 TU). In case 
of fraud or omissions in the income declarations made by the ap-
plicant, the recovery of past payment is also retroactive (art. 95), and 
so are the following:  a) allowances and costs of judges, employees 
and bailiffs for travel related to proceeding acts to be performed 
away from the proceeding location; b) witnesses travel allowances 
and costs; c) travel allowances and costs , duties and mailing costs 
for notifications of bailiffs upon request by the court or of one of the 
parties; d) travel allowances and costs, fees of authorized consultants 
and expert witnesses and private investigators; e) custody indemnity; 
f) fees and disbursements of attorneys; g) cost of ads published by 
the court. 
The determination of the above costs is due also when the criminal 
charges are dropped, whatever the conclusion of the criminal pro-
ceeding is and also in case of evident lack of grounds. It is however 
considered not due in case of a challenge that is declared inadmissible 
(art. 106 TU). Attorney’s fees, as well as fees due to consultants, 
expert witnesses and private investigators are determined based on 
the applicable tariffs, with a one third discount. 
In conclusion, legal aid in Italian criminal proceeding is in 
principle well structured, covering a very ample spectrum of pro-
ceedings, on the basis of a procedure offering sufficient guarantees 
to the applicants. Conversely, the relatively low-income threshold 
which is a condition of access to legal aid and the discounts applied 
to standard fees of attorneys and other professionals involved are 
weak points which should be reconsidered in the future. From a sta-
tistical point of view, a positive data is the growth of legal aid budget 
which, according to the Report mentioned above, has grown 30 times 
from 1995 to 2018, reflecting a comparable growth in the number of 
individuals granted the legal aid benefit.
5.8. civiL LeGaL aid
Article 24, sec. 3 of the Italian Constitution provides that ‘The 
poor are entitled by law to proper means for action or defense in all 
courts.’ In spite of that, until recently the possibilities offered to indi-
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viduals who did not have the financial resources to retain a lawyer of 
their choice where negligible. They could only rely on the so-called 
gratuito patrocinio: it was an old fashion scheme, according to which 
attorneys had the ‘honorary’ duty to provide their services for free. 
This scheme, established in 1865, had navigated unharmed through 
the Fascist Era and had even outlived the advent of the Constitution. 
Needless to say, the gratuito patrocinio was not a satisfactory reply 
to the needs of those who could not afford the assistance of a lawyer.
The first attempt at establishing a legal aid scheme supported 
by public funds was made in 1973: it concerned labor disputes only 
and it was never successful for a variety of reasons, but most of all 
because of the low-income threshold set for the eligibility of the 
scheme. But Italy had to wait until 1990 for the introduction of a real 
legal aid scheme, limited though to criminal cases. What prompted 
Italian legislators to get rid of the obsolete gratuito patrocinio was a 
drastic reform of criminal procedure, which was – so to say – Ameri-
canized, since it embraced the canons of the adversary process: a true 
revolution after centuries of inquisitorial system. It is worth men-
tioning, though, that no less than ten years before the enactment of 
the statute on legal aid supported by the public purse, the European 
Court of Human Rights, in the case of Artico v. Italy, had found Italy 
in violation of article 6, sec. 3 of the ECHR due to the many flaws 
of the system of gratuito patrocinio then in force. In particular, the 
Court stated that 
‘The Court recalls that the Convention is intended to 
guarantee not rights that are theoretical or illusory but 
rights that are practical and effective; this is particularly 
so of the rights of the defense in view of the prominent 
place held in a democratic society by the right to a fair 
trial. […] Article 6 par. 3 speaks of “assistance” (of a 
lawyer) and not of “nomination”. Again, mere nom-
ination does not ensure effective assistance since the 
lawyer appointed for legal aid purposes may die, fall 
seriously ill, be prevented for a protracted period from 
acting or shirk his duties’.71 
Only in 2001 was legal aid extended to civil cases; the year 
after all the rules and regulations on legal aid were consolidated in a 
single act (Consolidated Act on Costs of Legal proceedings of May 
30, 2002: in Italian, Testo unico delle spese di giustizia) and a few 
71 Case of Artico v. Italy (application no. 6694/74), May 13, 1980, para. 36, available at 
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{“itemid”:[“001-57424”]}
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changes were introduced to the previous provisions. 
At present, the basic rule on legal aid is Article 74 (L) of the Con-
solidated Act: sec 1 deals with legal aid in criminal cases, while sec. 
2 provides that ‘legal aid is guaranteed in civil and administrative 
cases, in cases concerning accountancy and taxation matters, as well 
as in non-contentious matters for the defense of low-income citizens 
provided that their claims are not clearly groundless’ (my translation). 
Legal aid is granted at every stage of judicial proceeding and before 
any courts; the rules apply both to plaintiffs and defendants. Unfor-
tunately, though, legal aid only applies to litigation, which means 
that in principle no legal aid is available for out-of-court advice and 
assistance.
Eligibility for legal aid (both in criminal and civil matter) is 
subject to a means test: in other words, the applicant’s annual taxable 
income must be below a predetermined threshold. This threshold, 
which is supposed to be increased every second year, is very low, 
currently being set at a little less that €12,000.00 (approximately, 
USD 13,000.00). It is clear that such a low threshold means that 
many applicants who certainly are neither well off, nor close to the 
poverty line have no access to legal aid Things are made even harsher 
if one keeps in mind that if the applicant has a family, the means test 
signifies that the annual taxable income of the whole family must be 
taken into account. If this situation occurs, the threshold is increased 
by €1032,91 per each family member, but such rule applies only if 
the application for legal aid concern criminal proceedings.
The application for civil legal aid must be lodged with the Council 
of the local bar association established in the district of the appellate 
court within which the court having jurisdiction over the case sits. 
The application is relatively simple as far as formal requirements 
are concerned; if it is granted, the person can choose his lawyer only 
among the lawyers listed in a special roster kept by the local bar 
council. Nor any licensed lawyer can be included in the roster: among 
the necessary requirement, one can mention a certified professional 
experience of at least two years and the fact of not having incurred in 
any disciplinary sanctions during the last five years. 
The person who has been deemed eligible for legal aid is ex-
empted from any payments concerning his case in court, since the 
State supports any costs, including attorney fees and the fees charged 
by expert witnesses. A serious downside of the scheme is that legal 
aid lawyers are paid much less than their colleagues, since the law 
provides that their fees cannot exceed one half of the average amount 
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of ordinary fees. Furthermore, considering the extenuating length of 
Italian civil proceedings, years can go by before the legal aid lawyer 
receives the clearance of payments and yet more years before the 
actual payment is made by the State.
It was not possible to find recent statistical data on civil legal 
aid. Rumor has it that civil legal aid is mostly resorted to in disputes 
concerning family law72, but there is no certainty that this statement 
holds true. Many technical aspects of civil legal aid (aspects that did 
not seem important enough to be described overcoming the hurdles 
of legal terms impossible to translate in a way that makes any sense) 
should be improved, but what is the most striking shortcoming is 
the ridiculous income threshold conditioning the availability of the 
scheme, in a country where the individuals with the major financial 
problems are those belonging to the lower-middle class, not poor 
enough to be eligible for social welfare benefits (including legal aid 
in front of civil courts) and not rich enough to be able to afford a 
lawyer of their choice.  
In 2005, when Italy had to implement Council Directive 2002/8/
EC of 27 January 2003 to improve access to justice in cross-border 
disputes by establishing minimum common rules relating to legal 
aid for such disputes, the national legislators failed to take the op-
portunity to develop the ‘minimum common rules’ laid down by 
the Directive so as to extend them to legal aid in domestic civil and 
commercial cases. That has left a few problems open and still unre-
solved. For instance, Article 10 of the Directive provides that ‘Legal 
aid shall also be extended to extrajudicial procedures, […], if the 
law requires the parties to use them, or if the parties to the dispute 
are ordered by the court to have recourse to them’, and the Italian 
statute implementing the Directive provides for the same rule almost 
verbatim:73 the paradox is that legal aid is available for out-of-court 
procedures for the resolution of cross-border disputes, while legal aid 
is not available for the same procedures aimed at resolving  domestic 
cases, even though these procedures are mandatory and require the 
necessary assistance of a lawyer. 
A final remark on legal aid: it is a subject that seems devoid of 
any interests for legislators, lawyers, and scholars. Scholars, in par-
ticular, focus on technical subjects that belong to the dogmatism of 
legal culture: unfortunately, the problems of social justice and the 
72 See V. Varano and A. De Luca, ‘Access to Justice in Italy’ (2007) 7 Global Jurist (Article 
6) at 21.
73 Legislative decree no. 116 of May 27, 2005, Article 10.
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search for a ‘justice with a human face’74 belong to another era. 
5.9. HoListic LeGaL services
To this author’s knowledge, the concept of holistic legal services, 
as structures that integrate legal services with programs aimed at 
breaking the cycle of poverty and increasing access to justice for vul-
nerable individuals, is unknown in Italy. There are non-profit organi-
zations that offer a variety of services, including legal services, but it 
is not possible to list them since often they do not belong to any na-
tional schemes and exist only at a local basis. The only organization 
that is worth mentioning is ‘Avvocati di strada’ (Street Lawyers: my 
translation): it is a project established in 2000, with offices in a few 
Italian cities (concentrated most of all in the Northern and central 
part of the country). Lawyers working pro bono offer legal advice 
and representation to homeless individuals.75
5.10. aLternative sources For LeGaL assistance
This is a wide and complex topic, because there is a real frag-
mentation in the alternative sources of legal assistance; many of them 
are included in services provided by a wide range of associations, 
that goes from the feminist ones (like the National Female Union 
– Unione femminile nazionale), to the consumers ones (Like Altro-
consumo), from trade unions to charities (like Caritas and its Legal 
Assistance Pool – Nucleo di assistenza legale); however, every asso-
ciation grants legal assistance in only its areas of interest, in general 
using volunteer lawyers. So, National Females Union is concerned 
with family law, Altroconsumo with consumers law, trade unions 
with labor law, and so on. There are also associations whose specific 
aim is to grant free legal assistance, as Street Lawyers (Avvocati di 
strada), that assist only homeless people. It is impossible to examine 
every kind of help, because every association has its norms.
It is also practiced by some lawyer, although illegal in Italy, the 
‘no win no fee’ arrangement (patto di quota lite), which grants the 
lawyer a percentage of what the client will obtain from the losing 
opponent. This method could allow poor people to obtain legal as-
sistance outside the legal aid system and without its limitations con-
cerning income thresholds. 
74 It is well known that this expression echoes the title of a collection of influential essays 
published in the 1970s: M. Storme (ed), Towards a Justice with a Human Face (Springer 1978).
75 See the website of ‘Avvocati di Strada’ at https://www.avvocatodistrada.it/. 
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6. COSTS OF RESOLVING DISPUTES WITHIN THE 
FORMAL JUDICIAL MACHINERY
6.1. overview oF judiciaL costs For LitiGants
For what concerns litigation costs related only to procedural 
costs (and so without the amount needed to pay the fee of a lawyer), 
they can be found in the yet cited consolidated law 115/2002, which 
is known in fact as “Bill on judicial costs” and which contained also, 
as we have seen, the regulation of legal aid.
There is a general difference between criminal trials and any 
other proceeding, in term of litigation costs: in criminal trials there 
is not a court tax required and the costs are prepaid by the State and 
inscribed as a debt for the charged person. This means that he will 
be required to pay them back once the trial will end and if he will be 
condemned to it by the judge while passing the judgement.
In any other proceeding (civil or administrative one) each litigant 
will pay the expenses required for what he wants to do in the process 
(for example legal notices or the summoning of witnesses) and at 
the end he will pay only court expenses; in this cases litigants are 
also generally required to pay a court fee, known as “contributo 
unificato”, to start a proceeding both at first instance and on appeal. 
The amount of this court fee is based on the value of the claim (art. 
13): it ranges from 43 euros for claims whose value is under €1,100 
euros to €1,686 euros for claims with a value in excess of €520,000 
euros, but it is increased by a half for appeals and doubled for the 
proceedings before the  Court of Cassation. However, there are many 
particular cases and exceptions that can cause a more relevant grow 
of the court fee before courts of first instance; on the other hand, 
there are particular kinds of proceedings exempted from the court 
tax. Therefore, it is impossible to have a general idea of the litigation 
costs that could be applied to every legal proceeding: this s also due 
to the fact that there are many other costs one might have to pay 
during the proceeding and which are summarized in art. 5: expenses 
for the notification of judicial acts and the travel of the bailiffs; al-
lowances and travel refunds for the witnesses; fees and travel refunds 
for the auxiliary staff of the judge; custody allowances for goods or 
assets seized; expenses of maintenance during detention; costs of 
publication for judge’s ruling; expenses for the eventually demolition 
of illegal buildings and for the restoration of the landscape; extraor-
dinary expenses. 
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6.2. exemption From judiciaL costs
In criminal cases, litigation costs prepaid by the State could be 
written off in the case of a disadvantaged person, that maintain a 
good behavior, both in and out of the prison, or in the case it was 
granted to him the legal aid.
In any other case the exemption from judicial costs is a result 
only of legal aid and so it follows the same eligibility criteria and the 
same process for application.
For criminal trials the copies of judicial documents are free of 
charge; any other expense is prepaid by the State and could be asked 
back to the charged person just in case it could be demonstrated that 
he hadn’t the exact requirements for receiving legal aid.
In any other proceeding there are some processual acts or ex-
penses (generally court taxes and rights of copying judicial doc-
uments) that are standing to the debit of the State; however others 
(the fees for the lawyer and for the experts, the travel expenses for 
witnesses and bailiffs and so on) are prepaid by the State; in both 
cases the person legally aided could been asked to pay them back (if 
the State has not get them from the losing counterpart) in the case she 
has gained from the trial six times the amount required, in the case 
she has opted out the action or if it will be declared the extinction of 
the process. Only the expenses prepaid by the State could be asked 
back irrespectively of the gain acquired. In case of a proceeding that 
will end in a settlement, the expenses done in debt must be paid by 
all (art. 134).
It seems clear, then, that from the point of view of the costs of 
justice, the Italian legal aid system grants that a person who is el-
igible for legal aid can begin a proceeding without any expense; the 
principle that one has to paid the costs of the proceeding if he will 
gain six times the amount required seems also reasonable, and in 
fact legal scholars do not seem to have underlined this aspect in the 
context of the criticism of the system in force.
6.3. mecHanisms to reduce costs by variations to courts and 
procedures
No mechanisms of this kind exist in Italy, since courts of special 
jurisdiction cannot be established due to a specific prohibition laid 
down by the Constitution.76  As far as simplified procedures are con-
76 Article 102, sec. 2 reads ‘Extraordinary or special judges may not be established. Only 
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cerned, one may argue that ADR schemes at large at aimed at re-
ducing costs for litigants. Furthermore, in certain specific areas the 
trend is to move away from judicial procedures and turn to adminis-
trative (or quasi-administrative) procedures: for instance, this is the 
case of the procedures that since 2014 have allowed the separation 
of spouses, as well as the dissolution of marriage through a special 
procedure in front of the Registrar in charge of the registers of the 
municipality where one of the spouses resides or where the marriage 
was registered. 
7. THE PROTECTION OF DIFFUSE AND COLLECTIVE 
RIGHTS.
Italy has a few forms of collective redress: group actions for in-
junctive relief; class actions for damages; and the so-called public 
class actions.  The first two are on the verge of a thorough reform, 
due to a comprehensive statute that was passed in 2019 but will enter 
into force in November 2020.77 Both types of collective redress will 
be governed by rules inserted in the Code of civil procedure; standing 
to sue, originally granted to consumers and users only has been ex-
tended and a few new procedural features have been laid down, with 
a view to making collective redress, and most of all class actions for 
damages, more attractive. As a matter of fact, Italian group actions, 
in theory available since 2010, have never been successful.78 Class 
actions for damages, in particular, had multiple procedural defects 
that the new rules are not likely to cure: the opt-in option is the 
main problem, since it implies cumbersome procedures to join the 
action. Furthermore, the fact that contingent fees arrangements are 
not allowed means that probably the most powerful drive that makes 
class actions interesting for attorneys is missing.
The so-called public class actions are special group actions 
available against public bodies in order to promote the efficiency of 
their action. They fall within the jurisdiction of administrative courts 
and can be considered as a ‘variation on the theme’ of collective 
specialised sections for specific matters within the ordinary judicial bodies may be established, 
and these sections may include the participation of qualified citizens who are not members of 
the Judiciary.’
77 See E. Silvestri, ‘Rebooting Italian Class Actions’, in C. H. van Rhee and A. Uzelac (eds), 
Class Actions – The Holy Grail of (European) Civil Procedure? (Springer 2020).
78 See extensively E. Silvestri, Class Actions in Italy: Great Expectations, Big 
Disappointment, in V. Harsági and C. H. van Rhee (eds), Multy-Party Redress Mechanism 
in Europe: Squeaking Mice? (Intersentia 2014) 197-208; R. Nashi, ‘Italy’s Class Action 
Experiment’ (2010) 43 Cornell Int’l L. J. 147-172.
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action for injunctive relief. They appear to be quite successful, even 
though they present two serious defects. The first one is that when 
the court finds for the class but the public entity fails to comply with 
the judgment, a new, special procedure must be commenced in order 
to obtain compliance with the court order. The second, even more 
serious defect has to do with the fact that if damages are claimed yet 
another special judicial proceeding must be instituted.
8. PROFESSIONAL LEGAL ETHICS.
A famous Italian scholar, Guido Alpa, who is also the former 
President of the National Bar Council of Italy, wrote:
‘That lawyers had to abide by ethical principles, tran-
scendent of the legal regulations of professional be-
haviour, was such a widespread and consolidated con-
viction during previous centuries as to be considered 
almost obvious, and therefore such as not to need dec-
larations or official positions on the part of represen-
tatives of the Bar.’79
That may explain why the first Code of Ethics for Italian lawyers 
was issued only in 1997. The Code was amended several times and, 
as a consequence of the enactment in 2012 of a statute redefining the 
structure and the role of the legal profession in Italy,80 the adoption 
of a new Code of Ethics became a priority. The Code of Ethics in 
force at present dates back to 2014. It consists of 73 articles and it is 
available in English, too.81 
Not many law schools have courses on legal ethics; when they 
do are part of the curriculum, these courses are hardly mandatory. 
In practice, a prospective lawyer is forced to study legal ethics when 
he is preparing to take the oral part of the bar exam (see above, para. 
2). Licensed lawyers must follow programs of continuing legal edu-
cation in order to maintain their qualification, so as to get at least 
nine credits (within a period of three years) attending conferences, 
seminars and the like dealing with legal ethics, provided that they 
are certified by the local Bar Councils as official events for the con-
79 See G. Alpa, ‘Lawyers’ ethics in Italy – an historical treatment with some comments on 
recent changes in approach’ (2010) 17 Int’l J. Legal Profession 307-318, at 307.
80 Statute no. 247 of December 31, 2012 carrying new rules governing the legal profession 
(in Italian, Nuova disciplina dell’ordinamento della professione forense). 




tinuing legal education. 
Only occasionally do lawyers lobby for law reform: in general, 
lawyers associations seem interested only in rules and regulations 
that could force them to give up prerogatives for which they claim 
a sort of monopoly. For instance, when an attempt at mediation was 
made mandatory and parties were supposed to appear in front of a 
mediator by themselves, lawyers went on strike. They do lobbies 
so that when mandatory mediation was reinstated (after it had been 
repealed by the Constitutional Court: see above, para. 3.3.) the as-
sistance of lawyers was made compulsory from the very beginning 
of the mediation procedure. Furthermore, a new rule provided that 
lawyers are mediators ‘as of right’, while anyone else is supposed to 
follow a special training theoretical and practical.
9. TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION AND ACCESS TO 
JUSTICE
E-justice is quite developed, but it is fair to say that no promising 
initiatives exist – at least to these authors’ knowledge – with the view 
to improving access to justice. Even though most people have smart 
phones, they do use them either for leisure or occasionally for ac-
cessing services that have nothing to do with access to justice. As 
mentioned, many times in this report, if a person has a legal issue of 
any kind, the simplest thing to do is to turn to a lawyer, making an ap-
pointment and visit him in his office since most lawyers do not offer 
advice via telephone or the web. 
10. UNMET LEGAL NEEDS
In Italy there has never been a countrywide study assessing the 
needs for a better and easier access to justice. In general, any kinds 
of legal problem forces individuals to turn to a lawyer, since public 
services in charge of granting legal advice are lacking. The legal aid 
system, available throughout the whole country, can be resorted to 
only for court procedures but is not accessible when a person wants 
to jot down a contract or is simply interested in understanding his 
own rights. It is only up to the lawyer to decide whether or not to 
provide legal advice free of charge.
11. PUBLIC LEGAL EDUCATION
The only program of public legal education existing in primary 
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and secondary schools was introduced in 201982 and includes the 
study of the Constitution, of the principles of European Union law 
and organization, in order to raise awareness for environmental sus-
tainability and support an active citizenship, as well as the right to 
health and well-being of the person83. Every school should decide the 
program, which must last at least 33 hours.
From a more general point of view, neither programs of public 
legal education for the general citizenship nor programs devoted to 
inform the population about the legal aid system exist. Therefore, it is 
difficult for a lay person to understand correctly his rights or to know 
about the availability of legal aid: this is the reasons why in Italy to 
turn to a lawyer and rely on his advice is still a fundamental step in 
the access to justice process. 
12. CONCLUSIONS 
The preparation of this Report has been for one of its authors the 
occasion for taking out of the bookshelves the volumes of Access to 
Justice and engaging in the reading of the General Report written by 
the late Mauro Cappelletti and Bryant Garth. The discovery of a few 
passages underlined in red and blue showed that many years have 
gone by from the first reading of the book: to the contrary, though, the 
concepts and principles emerging from the General Report fill pages 
that could have been written just yesterday.
The vision of a better access to justice, so as to make justice more 
accessible to everybody, including the underprivileged individuals, 
without the trade off of a lower quality in the services offered, is still 
a beacon of inspiration for many, even though the hardships of re-
curring economic recession and ensuing budgetary restrictions make 
it difficult to adopt measures suitable to turn this vision into reality. 
The Italian situation seems to mirror this difficulty. The ad-
ministration of justice, whether civil, criminal or administrative, is 
definitely one of the most critical aspects of the present situation: 
excessive delay of judicial proceedings, a myriad of different pro-
cedures, overcrowded dockets, jam-packed prisons, an uncontrolled 
army of lawyers, you name it. 
Alexander Hamilton once said that the first duty of society is 
justice: if this is the goal of Italian society, there is still a long way 
to go.
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